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A PRESCRIPTION FOR CURING U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS
GREGORY W. BOWMAN*
Unlike inbound trade regulation, which is characterized by deep
multilateralism, the regulation of export trade is characterized by
significant unilateralism. Nowhere is this more apparent than with the
United States’ assertions of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction under
its export control laws. Since 1982, the United States has claimed the
power to regulate the use and reexport of U.S. origin goods, software, and
technologies located abroad, based primarily on the fact that these items
are of U.S. origin (or are foreign-origin items with some U.S. content).
These “item origin-based” jurisdictional claims, which first were made as
part of a trade dispute with European countries over a proposed natural
gas pipeline from the Soviet Union, resulted in a flurry of academic
commentary in the 1980s, with most commentators condemning this U.S.
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the years since, attention to the
issue has waned, but the United States’ assertion of item origin-based
export control jurisdiction remains in place and unresolved as a matter of
international law.
This Article asserts that the United States’ longstanding claim of
extraterritorial export control jurisdiction is an underappreciated but
vitally important issue that needs to be readdressed. International trade
has grown exponentially since 1982, and the result is that the United
States’ asserted jurisdictional reach has grown vastly broader. This
Article explains the nature and mechanics of the United States’ item
origin-based jurisdictional claim, provides a summary of the 1982 Soviet
gas pipeline trade dispute, reconsiders the justifiability of the United
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States’ jurisdictional claim under the prescriptive jurisdictional principles
of international law, and finds the current approach legally awkward and
strategically insufficient. It then considers the issue through the lens of
more recent scholarship on transnational networks, mutual recognition
arrangements, and unilateral trade actions, and concludes by
recommending a multilateral approach that offers greater promise of both
policy effectiveness and legality under international law.
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“Few questions of international law are more complex than those
1
posed by extraterritoriality.”
—Report by A.L.C. de Mestral & T. Gruchalla-Wesierski to
Canadian Council on International Law, 1990
“By acting unilaterally on the basis of dubious concepts of
jurisdiction, the United States wastes political capital and jeopardizes
2
its influence . . . .”
—Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Council on Foreign Relations, in Export
Controls in Transition (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
Export controls are a troubled area of international trade regulation.
In contrast to inbound trade matters such as customs (import) laws and
trade remedy laws, for which there is significant multilateral cooperation
3
and enforcement through the World Trade Organization (WTO),
4
relatively little WTO attention is devoted to export control matters. To
the extent that outbound trade issues do garner attention within the
5
WTO, the focus usually is on trade-prohibiting sanctions or embargoes,
1. A.L.C. DE MESTRAL & T. GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION: CANADA AND THE U.S.A. 3 (1990).
2. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The Problem of Extraterritoriality in U.S. Export Control
Policy, in EXPORT CONTROLS IN TRANSITION: PERSPECTIVES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS
148, 163 (Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elliott-Gower eds., 1992).
3. See GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN HO UHM,
TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 1–2 (2010); ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM:
LAW, POLITICS & LEGITIMACY 10–12 (2007); Valentina Delich, Developing Countries and
the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO 71, 71
(Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002); Bernard Hoekman, The WTO: Functions and Basic
Principles, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO, supra, at 41, 41–42.
4. See DE MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 1, at 5, 44–48 (1990); see
also HOWSE, supra note 3, at 185–92 (describing John Jackson’s proposal to incorporate
GATT into the WTO); Kenneth W. Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy
Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 849–57 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the WTO Challenge:
Making a Case for the United States Under the GATT National Security Exception, 11 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 559, 560 (1997); Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International
Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 133, 133 (2002); Peter L. Fitzgerald,
Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade Organization: A Commentary on Blacklisting,
Federalism, and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 3
(2001); Joaquín Roy, Lawyers Meet the Law: Critical U.S. Voices of Helms-Burton, 6 U.
MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 39, 42 (1997–1998); Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty, Influence,
Realpolitik and the World Trade Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 341, 356
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which (as discussed below) are conceptually distinct from export
6
controls. The result is that current multilateral cooperation in export
7
controls is based largely on consensus, and unilateralism is hard to
8
restrain.
Nowhere is unilateralism in export control measures more apparent
than in the United States’ longstanding assertions of extraterritoriality
in U.S. export controls. Since the early 1980s, the United States has
claimed the right to assert jurisdiction over foreign transactions, based
on the fact that those transactions involve goods, software, or
9
technologies that are of U.S. origin or contain U.S. content. This “item
origin-based” jurisdictional approach is quite different from
traditionally accepted forms of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction
under international law, such as territorial jurisdiction or jurisdiction
10
based on the nationality of persons.
The United States’ novel
approach has infringed on the trade regulation efforts of the United
States’ trading partners, and by preventing deeper multilateral
consensus in export control matters, it has impaired the collective
effectiveness of multilateral export controls through various
11
international organizations and agreements. By the same token, this
(2002); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under WTO?, 27 STETSON
L. REV. 1313, 1313–14 (1998).
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.G.
8. In fact, multilateral export control cooperation has moved backward since the end of
the Cold War. The now-defunct Coordinating Committee (COCOM) system of the Cold
War era had meaningful enforcement mechanisms to promote national compliance with its
multilateral export control scheme. However, its successor, the current Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies, relies on consensus for compliance, with no meaningful enforcement
mechanisms for noncompliance. For further discussion of COCOM and the Wassenaar
Arrangement, see infra Part II.G.
9. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends: Four Perspectives, 4
CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 358, 362–65 (2003); see also Gregory W. Bowman, E-Mails, Servers, and
Software: U.S. Export Controls for the Modern Era, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 319, 328, 334–35
(2004).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
11. See Missile Technology Control Regime, The Missile Technology Control Regime,
MCTR.INFO, http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Objectives of
the Group, AUSTRALIAGROUP.NET, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/objectives.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2014); Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, Overview of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, OPCW.ORG, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/abo
ut-the-convention/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., Introduction, WASSENAAR.ORG,
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U.S. approach to export control jurisdiction also has hindered the
United States’ own foreign policy and national security objectives in the
12
realm of international trade.
The impact of the item origin-based
approach is magnified by the fact that the United States has been the
13
world’s largest economy for decades and is one of its largest exporters.
The nature of U.S. export control jurisdiction thus presents an
important and perplexing problem. And yet a threshold question must
be asked: why address this topic now? It was considered in detail by
scholarly commentators in the 1980s, in the wake of a U.S. trade dispute
with European trading partners over the construction of a natural gas
14
pipeline from the Soviet Union. If the efforts of those scholars did not
http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); What Are the
Guidelines?, NUCLEARSUPPLIERSGROUP.ORG, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/
02-guide.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
12. In general, unilateral approaches to international trade regulation are not successful.
See William J. Long, Global Security, Democratization, and Economic Development After the
Cold War: New Goals for U.S. Export Control Policies, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
ON NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS 59, 69 (Gary Bertsch et al. eds., 1994) (noting
that unilateral controls “seldom succeed in inflicting meaningful economic damage on the
target”).
13. According to WTO trade figures, U.S. GDP in 2012 was U.S. $15,684,800 million,
and its exports of goods totaled U.S. $1,545,709 million (f.o.b. value)—which made the
United States the world’s second-largest exporter by value, behind only China. See World
Trade Org., United States Trade Profile, WTO.ORG, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDB
CountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); World Trade
Org., International Trade Statistics 2013, WTO.ORG, www.wto.org/english/res_e/.../its2013_e.p
df.
14. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL & WILLIAM M. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS
AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 53–67
(1982); Cecil Hunt, The Jurisdictional Reach of Export Controls, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 19, 19–20 (1987); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and
Extraterritorial Trade Controls, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118, 130 (1987); J.W.
Bridge, The Law and Politics of United States Foreign Policy Export Controls, 4 LEGAL
STUD. 2 (1984); Stanley J. Marcuss & D. Steven Mathias, U.S. Foreign Policy Export
Controls: Do They Pass Muster Under International Law?, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1, 12
(1984); Duane D. Morse & Joan S. Powers, U.S. Export Controls and Foreign Entities: The
Unanswered Questions of Pipeline Diplomacy, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 537 (1983); Homer E.
Moyer, Jr. & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History,
Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1983)
(discussing, inter alia, extraterritorial application of U.S. export control laws); Janet Lunine,
Note, High Technology Warfare: The Export Administration Act Amendments of 1985 and the
Problem of Foreign Reexport, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 667–68 (1986); Note,
Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and
American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308 (1983) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Application]; Note,
Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1317–18, 1318 n.42 (1985) [hereinafter Predictability and Comity].
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lead to successful resolution of this jurisdictional issue, is it worth reopening this vein of inquiry now? Why not just let sleeping dogs lie?
This Article contends that the item origin-based extraterritoriality of
U.S. export controls is a critically important matter that deserves
immediate reexamination. There are several reasons why this is so.
First, the topic is timely. There is renewed U.S. interest in export
control reform and modernization for the first time in nearly two
15
decades, and extending this discussion to jurisdictional matters is a
natural progression. Second, there has been a dramatic upsurge in
global trade in recent decades, which means that these U.S. assertions of
broadly extraterritorial export control jurisdiction have much larger
16
consequences than ever before.
Third, the current U.S. national security and foreign policy
landscape is vastly different from that of the Cold War and the pre-9/11
era, and that has enormous implications for the jurisdictional reach of
U.S. export controls. During the Cold War, the need to regulate an
exported item depended largely on where it was going, and a central
purpose of export controls was to prevent (or at least heavily restrict)
exports and reexports to various communist countries. In the post-Cold
War era, however, “destination” cannot be used nearly as readily as a
proxy for “undesired export” (or reexport). Some exports or reexports
to Russia or China (or any other destination) are desirable, and some
are not, depending on the intended use for the items and the parties
15. The last time serious attention was paid to U.S. export control reform was
immediately prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks; those legislative efforts were
abandoned following those attacks. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 325–26.
16. This upsurge in global trade is due to a number of reasons. Tariff rates have
dropped dramatically for all WTO countries, with the result (predicted by neoclassical
economics) that trade has grown as this particular transaction cost has been eliminated. See
Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the Forward
Deployment of the U.S. Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, 196–97 (2007). Shipping and
multimodal transportation costs also have dropped significantly, reducing another key
transaction cost of imports and exports. Id. at 197–98. Both production activities and
research and development (R&D) have become more trans-border in nature, which of course
necessitates international trade in goods, software, and technology to support these activities.
See Bowman, supra note 9, at 321. And the growth of e-commerce and electronic
communications means that today there are many trans-border transfers of software or
technology that were not possible two decades ago—transfers that, while non-physical, are
nonetheless considered exports or reexports by the United States. Id. at 351–56. Considered
together, these changes mean there are exponentially more U.S.-origin goods and
technologies outside the United States—and that, in turn, means there are exponentially
more foreign activities over which the United States now claims item origin-based
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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17

involved. The same is true of exports or reexports to anywhere else.
As a result, the United States is now far more inclined to assert
jurisdiction extraterritorially over activities in many different countries,
and expansive extraterritoriality has become an ever more central and
indelible feature of U.S. export controls.
Fourth, none of the U.S. export control reform efforts since 1982
(when the issue of item origin-based jurisdiction came to the fore) have
addressed questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
A major
modernization of U.S. export controls was undertaken in 1995–1996, but
18
it left the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls untouched.
Unsuccessful efforts in 2000 and 2001 to enact new U.S. export control
19
legislation also ignored jurisdictional matters. Current initiatives by
the Obama Administration to simplify the structure of U.S. export
controls and double U.S. exports are highly laudable—such streamlining
and export promotion efforts are badly needed and long overdue—but
these efforts too are blind to the problematic nature of U.S. export
20
control jurisdiction. The subject of U.S. export control jurisdiction is,
therefore, an important one that warrants renewed attention. A
solution not only could resolve the long-simmering question of
jurisdictional reach, but also actually advance the goals of U.S. export
controls and those of the United States’ major trading partners.
This Article presents a two-part thesis. First, it reconsiders whether
item origin-based export control jurisdiction might be justified under
17. The term of art used for such determinations is “end-user.” Export Administration
Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining “End-user” as “[t]he person abroad that
receives and ultimately uses the exported or reexported items. The end-user is not a
forwarding agent or intermediary, but may be the purchaser or ultimate consignee.”).
18. See Export Administration Regulation; Simplification of Export Administration
Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714 (Mar. 25, 1996) (providing for reform and simplification of
U.S. Export Administration Regulations).
19. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 324–26.
20. See Export Control List Review and Creating a Single Control List, EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027617.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing export
classification reform); Licensing Policy Review and Building a Single Licensing Agency,
EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027616.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014)
(discussing unification of export licensing into a single agency in order to increase licensing
process transparency and predictability and reduce processing times); A Modern Information
Technology (IT) System for Export Controls, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_02
7615.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing export control information technology
modernization); Export Control Enforcement, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_0
27618.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing harmonization of export violation
investigations and penalties); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
32 (2010) (setting forth the “goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2014”).
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existing international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction. It
concludes that it remains quite awkward to do so. Specifically, while it
is possible today to justify more of the reach of U.S. item origin-based
export control jurisdiction than in 1982, the full scope of item originbased jurisdiction still cannot be justified under these principles.
Second, and more importantly, the national security and foreign policy
goals pursued by the United States through its export controls are not
well-served by item origin-based jurisdiction, and for that reason the
current approach should be abandoned in favor of an approach that
better serves those goals.
In exploring the first part of this thesis, Part II of this Article will
provide an overview of U.S. export controls and their history, in order
to explain how the item origin-based approach to jurisdiction developed.
The subject of export controls is a technical one, so understanding the
mechanics and history of U.S. export controls is an essential predicate to
analyzing it. Part III then will review the United States’ assertions of
item origin-based extraterritorial jurisdiction through the lens of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States and
earlier scholarship relevant to extraterritorial export control
21
jurisdiction. In exploring the second part of this thesis, Part IV will
consider the matter through the lens of more recent scholarship on
22
23
network theory, transnational mutual recognition arrangements, and
24
unilateralism and norm development. This discussion will underscore
how both the jurisdictional principles of international law and the policy

21. The Restatement (Third) is generally considered an accurate rendering of
international law’s principles of prescriptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., DE MESTRAL &
GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 1, at 17 (“Major treatises address the issue of
extraterritoriality. . . . What emerges from this body of writing is something close to a
consensus on the categories of analysis in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe . . . .” (footnote
omitted)). It is worth noting that much of the original 1980s scholarship on this topic was
published before the Restatement (Third) had been finalized, and much of the previous
analysis was pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.
22. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (arguing
for the adoption of network theory).
23. See generally Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual
Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
263 (2005).
24. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) (discussing unilateral U.S. efforts in the area of
international human rights as a means to promote multilateral cooperation or norm
development); Cleveland, supra note 5 (same).
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goals pursued by the United States through export controls would be
better satisfied by a new “purpose-based” jurisdictional approach to
export controls that bases extraterritoriality on generally agreed-upon
nonproliferation and missile technology-restrictive goals of the U.S. and
multilateral export control regimes. It also will make clear that while a
new jurisdictional approach likely would be more multilateral than the
current U.S. item origin-based approach, the United States would not
need to abandon all unilateral or asymmetrically expansive aspects of its
current approach.
Part V will draw on this recent scholarship to recommend changes to
the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. export control regime, and for
jurisdiction within the multilateral export control system generally. Part
VI will offer concluding thoughts, including practical suggestions for
implementation of such an approach.
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that this Article deliberately
focuses on doctrine and doctrinal change—on understanding the extent
to which U.S. assertions of export jurisdiction fall within the boundaries
of traditional international law doctrine, and on considering how both
U.S. practice and international law doctrinal rules might be altered to
bring U.S. activities within the permissible scope of international law
prescriptive jurisdiction. The analysis, therefore, proceeds from the
25
traditional premise that international law is indeed law. Regardless of
26
one’s view of international law and its limits, the hope is that doctrinal
consideration of this topic will help clarify and resolve, both legally and
policywise, a long-festering and increasingly important problem of
27
international trade regulation. Revisiting this topic also will prove
25. See Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293
(1984–1985); see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 121, 134–35 (2007) (discussing state adherence to, versus refusal to follow,
universal jurisdiction as customary international law).
26. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005) (asserting that international law rests not on opinio juris but rather on interest
maximization, that international law is less robust than domestic law, and that states have no
normative, moral obligation to comply with the rules of international law); D’Amato, supra
note 25, at 1314 (discussing differences and similarities between domestic and international
law, and concluding that “[t]he ‘serious students of law’ who claim that international law isn’t
really ‘law’ make the same mistake that some political scientists make in ignoring norms in
order to be ‘scientific’ in their ‘descriptions’”).
27. The question of whether the doctrinal rules of prescriptive international jurisdiction
should be altered is also a question worthy of consideration, but that is outside the scope this
Article.
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useful in light of current efforts by the American Law Institute to
prepare a Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
28
States.
II. BACKGROUND: U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS AND THEIR
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
The details of U.S. export controls have been discussed at length
29
elsewhere, and it is not the goal of this Article simply to retread that
same ground.
Yet because export controls are complex, an
understanding of their history and structure is necessary to appreciate
fully the problems presented by extraterritorial reach. This Part
accordingly provides an overview of U.S. export controls, their
evolution, and their intended purposes. First, however, it is important
to clarify the under-appreciated distinction between export controls and
trade sanctions (or embargoes).
A. The Distinction Between Export Controls and Trade Sanctions
Modern scholars and policymakers, as well as the Restatement
(Third), typically do not make a clear distinction between export
controls and trade sanctions, but rather treat them as two sides of the
30
same coin. This is understandable because export controls and trade
sanctions both are used to prevent unwanted transactions, and because
current U.S. export controls originated as a post-World War II trade31
restrictive regime (as discussed below). Yet in the modern context, the
32
strong trade-promotion focus of U.S. export controls stands in clear

28. The Am. Law Inst., Publications Catalog, ALI.ORG, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fus
eaction=%20publications.ppage&node_id=33 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
29. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 9, at 328–49 (discussing the origins of modern U.S.
export controls for civilian and dual use goods and the current technical structure of these
controls); Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 357–60 (discussing post-World War II origins and
development of U.S. export controls for civilian and dual use goods). For detailed technical
analyses of U.S. export control laws and regulations, see ERIC L. HIRSCHHORN, THE EXPORT
CONTROL AND EMBARGO HANDBOOK (3d ed. 2010); WILLIAM A. ROOT, JOHN R.
LIEBMAN & ROSZEL C. THOMSEN II, UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS (5th ed. 2010).
30. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 4, at 756–57; Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361–68
(discussing the Soviet Pipeline export control dispute and the Cuban embargo); Moyer &
Mabry, supra note 14, at 2–3. For an article making a clear distinction between U.S. export
controls and trade sanctions, see Fitzgerald, supra note 5.
31. See infra Part II.C.2.
32. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2006) (noting the
importance of export promotion to the economic well-being of the United States).
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contrast to the trade-restrictive nature of U.S. trade sanctions. That is,
while export controls can be used as a tool for implementing particular
34
trade sanctions programs, a core purpose of U.S. export controls is to
35
The governing presumptions are thus poles apart:
promote trade.
trade sanctions presumptively prohibit trade, and export controls
presumptively permit trade, within certain limits. These presumptions
can be overcome, but they set the regulatory tone and focus for each
type of program.
The differences between export controls and trade sanctions also
play out jurisdictionally: export control jurisdiction is based on the
origin of the items regulated, whereas trade sanction jurisdiction
36
generally is based on the parties and countries regulated.
Trade
sanctions also often restrict imports and financial transactions, which are
37
activities outside the scope of export controls.
The difference in
jurisdictional scope has enormous ramifications in terms of
38
extraterritoriality: in response to foreign objections, the United States
33. See U.S. Dep’t of State: Directorate of Def. Trade Controls, Country Policies and
Embargoes, STATE.GOV (Oct. 4, 2013), http://pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/index.ht
ml (noting the list of countries that the United States currently has embargoed).
34. The U.S. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774 (2013), provide
an “assist” to U.S. trade sanctions programs by applying complementary export prohibitions
to those countries, but these provisions are expressly intended as carve-outs to the generally
permissive scheme of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). See id. §§ 736.2(b)(6),
746 (“Export or reexport to embargoed destinations” and “Embargoes and Other Special
Controls”).
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. See, e.g., Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 538.205, 538.315 (2013)
(regarding jurisdiction over “United States person” and defining same); Iranian Transactions
and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204, 560.314 (2013) (regarding jurisdiction over
“United States person” and defining same).
37. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “embargo” as the
“collective restrictions on the import or export of goods, materials, capital, or services into or
from a specific country or group of countries for political or security reasons”), with U.S.
Dep’t of State: Directorate of Def. Trade Controls, Overview of U.S. Export Control System,
STATE.GOV, http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (noting
one of the essential elements of an effective export control is a broad international scope
rather than a targeting of specific, offensive countries).
38. An exception to this is the “trafficking” restriction contained in the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act. 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (2012). Commonly known as the HelmsBurton Act after its congressional sponsors, Article III of the Act contained provisions to
enable U.S. nationals who held claims in expropriated Cuban property to file suit in U.S.
federal court for damages against foreign nationals who “trafficked” in that property. See id.
§§ 6023(13), 6081–6091. While this provision does not per se represent a shift away from
person-based jurisdiction, it does use a property-based approach to expand the scope of
prohibited activity. In any event, this provision has never come into force: it has been
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actually reduced the extraterritorial reach of its trade sanctions
programs by adopting a more restrictive definition of “U.S. Persons”
(individuals and companies) who are subject to those programs under
39
nationality jurisdiction.
By contrast, item origin-based jurisdiction
under U.S. export controls was expanded in the 1980s and has remained
expansive ever since.
B. Jurisdictional Validity Under U.S. Law
While the extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls is of
questionable legality under international law, it must be noted that this
extraterritorial reach appears valid for U.S. law purposes. Congress
intended the primary export control statute, the Export Administration
40
Act of 1979 (EAA of 1979), to apply extraterritorially, at least with
respect to jurisdiction over U.S. persons and companies located
41
abroad —which means that the general U.S. law presumption against
suspended by every president since President Clinton, pursuant to presidential discretion as
provided for in the Act. See Delegation of Authority to Suspend the Provisions of Title III of
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 78 Fed. Reg. 9573
(Feb. 8, 2013); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Letter from the
President Regarding the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996 (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/letterpresident-regarding-cuban-liberty-and-democratic-solidarity-liber (“Consistent with section
306(c)(2) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-114) (the “Act”), I hereby determine and report to the Congress that suspension, for
6 months beyond February 1, 2012, of the right to bring an action under title III of the Act is
necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba.”); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential
Memorandum—Delegation of Authority to Suspend the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Jan. 31, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/31/presidential-memorandum-delegationauthority-suspend-provisions-title-ii.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note.
40. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503–536 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–20 (2006)). The EAA of 1979 actually expired in 1994,
with one brief respite from 2000 to 2001, and the export control regulations promulgated
under this statute were kept in force (with minor modifications) during this period of expiry
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07; see
also Bowman, supra note 9, at 331–32. Permanent export control enforcement authority
under the EAA of 1979 was finally reestablished in 2010 pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 305, 124 Stat.
1312, 1349–50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8544 (2012)).
41. See 125 Cong. Rec. 8259–62 (1979); see also Extraterritorial Application, supra note
14, at 1312–13. Specifically, the EAA of 1979 amended Section 4(b) of the EAA of 1969 to
expand the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls by deleting language that
unambiguously limited the jurisdictional reach of the act to exports from the United States, its
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extraterritoriality is overcome as regards person-based (nationality)
42
jurisdiction. The statute does not contain express language regarding
item origin-based extraterritoriality, but the U.S. Export Administration
43
Regulations (EAR) promulgated pursuant to that statute do. The U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which
administers the EAR, has not explained the international law
jurisdictional bases for item origin-based export control jurisdiction
44
(perhaps because it is hard to justify legally), and recent governmental
45
practice has been simply to ignore it. Still, the Bureau of Industry and
Security almost certainly would be given a significant degree of
deference regarding its interpretation (through the EAR) of the statute
46
and its purpose—either pursuant to the Chevron doctrine (under
territories, and possessions. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(a), 93
Stat. 503, 506 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (2006)); Export Administration
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841, 842 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2404 (2006)). The resulting language was as follows:
To effectuate the policies set forth in section 3 of this Act, the President may
prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States, its territories and
possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies including technical data or any
other information, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe, of
any articles, materials or supplies, including technical data or any other information,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(deleted text is struck through; added text is italicized).
42. As David Koplow has pointed out, from the perspective of international law, the
general U.S. presumption against extraterritoriality establishes a default presumption in favor
of using subjective territoriality (jurisdiction over acts within U.S. borders) as the basis for
U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction. David A. Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms:
Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 41–42
(1990).
43. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (2013).
44. See id. § 772.1 (definitions of “Export,” “Reexport,” and “Item”); Marcuss &
Mathias, supra note 14, at 19.
45. See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–20 (2006)); H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 21–22
(1977); see also S. REP. NO. 96-169, at 2–3 (1979); David H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 283, 285 n.15 (1987). Cf. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1308; Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 292 (1949) (applying a U.S. labor statute to Panama Canal
contractors in the “foreign territory” of the Canal Zone, notwithstanding “the canon of
construction which teaches [us] that [the] legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,”
because the law was “within the usual scope of Congressional concern” (citing Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))).
46. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Chevron Step Two, as a reasonable interpretation of an unclear statute
by the administering agency), or on the basis of deference under
47
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (because of significant agency knowledge and
expertise). Export controls are the quintessence of a technical and
policy-driven area of the law, and the agency is in a far better position
than generalist courts to be attuned to the export control desires of
Congress. It is thus nearly certain that the current extraterritorial scope
48
of the statute, as applied through the EAR, would withstand any
49
domestic law challenge. In any event, such a legal challenge is unlikely :
most U.S. case law regarding extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
50
concerns criminal law and antitrust law matters. The question, then, is
47. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
different approaches under Chevron and Skidmore nicely:

Jerry Mashaw summarizes the

Chevron relies on constitutional structure, Congress’s legitimate authority to
delegate lawmaking power to administrative agencies, and the political
accountability of those agencies to the President and to Congress. Skidmore sounds
in “capacity” or “expertise” the potential for accurate understanding by agencies
immersed in both the politics of congressional enactment and the day-to-day
administration of statutory texts.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 505 (2005). Skidmore deference has
had a resurgence of sorts in recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. See United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Delivering the Goods: Herein of
Mead, Delegations, and Authority, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 307, 327 (2009) (“[The Mead
Court] held that Skidmore deference was alive and well as a possible congressionallymandated judicial response to agency outputs . . . .”).
48. See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2 (2013) (defining the scope of EAR export prohibitions—and,
by implication, permissible exports—in terms of “exports” and “reexports”); id. § 734.2(b)(1),
(4) (defining “export” to mean “an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the
EAR out of the United States, or release of technology or software subject to the EAR to a
foreign national in the United States,” and “reexport” to mean “an actual shipment or
transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign
country; or release of technology or software subject to the EAR to a foreign national outside
the United States”). The term “release” in the definition refers to the conveyance of software
or technology to foreign nationals (either in the United States or elsewhere), which are
deemed to be nonphysical “exports or reexports” of such software or technology to the
foreign nationals’ home country. See id. § 734.2(b)(3), (5).
49. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 70 (“More than nine out of ten law
suits are settled or dismissed well before trial.”). The exceptions often have to do with the
proper scope of federal versus state power. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936); Gregory W. Bowman, U.S. and Canadian Federalism: Implications for International
Trade Regulation, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1007, 1026–27 (2012).
50. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (antitrust); United
States v. Dawn, 129 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 1997) (criminal law); United States v. Morton, 314
F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–13 (D. Md. 2004) (criminal law); Alcar Grp., Inc. v. Corporate
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the legality of the item origin-based approach under international law.
To address that question, however, requires an appreciation of the
historical origins and evolution of U.S. export controls.
C. The Historical Context: A Generally Permissive Regime
1. Origins
In light of the explosive growth in U.S. international trade over the
51
past several decades, it is tempting to think of the modern U.S. focus
on export promotion as a sea change in American attitudes toward
exports. However, the current focus on export promotion is consistent
with a longstanding U.S. preference for permitting exports, not
preventing them. That is, historically the United States has imposed
relatively few export controls or trade sanctions. Indeed, for much of
the nineteenth century the United States adopted the principle of “free
ships, free goods” in international trade, meaning that neutral ships not
carrying “contraband”—prohibited or unlawful articles—were to be
52
given free passage and be permitted to trade. A preference for export
promotion is also built into the U.S. Constitution, which permits the
53
taxation of imports but expressly prohibits the taxation of exports.
Export controls are thus part of an historical U.S. tradition of
facilitating, not restricting, trade.

Performance Sys., Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (antitrust).
51. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 321–23.
52. RICHARD T. CUPITT, RELUCTANT CHAMPIONS: U.S. PRESIDENTIAL POLICY AND
STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS 35 (2000).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State.”). The Export Clause was included at the insistence of export-dependent southern
states, and it stands in direct contrast to duties on imports, which are constitutionally
permissible. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1186 n.324 (2003) (citing United
States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996)); see also Claire R. Kelly &
Daniela Amzel, Does the Commerce Clause Eclipse the Export Clause?: Making Sense of
United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 84 MINN. L. REV. 129, 146 (1999) (discussing
Southern desire to avoid taxation of exports as a reason for the Export Clause). While the
U.S. Constitution’s preferential treatment of exports is perhaps an embodiment of a lateeighteenth century mercantilistic view of facilitating exports (by prohibiting export taxation)
and impeding imports (partly for protective purposes and partly for revenue generation via
tariffs), the promotion of exports remains valid economic policy under modern (and less
mercantilistic) views of international trade.
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2. Impact of the Cold War
The restrictive U.S. export control system that developed during the
early Cold War era is thus a significant historical deviation. Yet even
the post-war system itself did not start out as a trade-restrictive export
regime. Rather, the initial, twofold purpose under the original
comprehensive U.S. export control statute, the Export Control Act of
54
1949 (ECA of 1949), was (a) to ease U.S. domestic shortages of
strategically and economically important goods (in the wake of years of
war rationing) and (b) to channel exports toward the reconstruction of
55
Europe. It was, in other words, initially a re-directional regime, not a
restrictive regime. Moreover, while the system evolved in the late 1940s
and early 1950s into a comprehensive anticommunist system of controls
56
intended to prevent exports to the Soviet bloc and China —in effect, an
57
anticommunist trade embargo —trade facilitation concerns quickly
regained ascendant status. Successor statutes to the ECA of 1949—the
58
Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA of 1969) and the EAA of
59
1979 —placed U.S. anticommunist trade restrictions within an overall
framework of export controls that were expressly intended to promote
U.S. economic growth through the facilitation and promotion of exports,
60
including exports to communist countries. This structure remains in
54. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 (1952)).
55. See CUPITT, supra note 52, at 64–71. This was undertaken pursuant to broad
presidential authority granted by that Act. See Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 8111, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 (1952)) (granting the
President broad authority to “prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States” of
articles subject to the Act, “except under such rules [authorizing exports] as he shall
prescribe”); see also Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, U.S. Export Controls—Past,
Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 794–95 (1967) (discussing the restrictive nature
of the Export Control Act of 1949); Paul H. Silverstone, The Export Control Act of 1949:
Extraterritorial Enforcement, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (1959) (same).
56. CUPITT, supra note 52, at 70–76. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 9; Silverstone,
supra note 55, at 343–44.
57. For additional discussion of the distinction between export controls and trade
sanctions, see supra notes 30–39.
58. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006)).
59. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006)).
60. See Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Note, The Export Administration Amendments Act of
1985: A Reassessment and Proposals for Further Reform, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811,
819 (1986) (“The EAA of 1969 reflected the view that trade should be encouraged with
communist nations as well as with the market economies of Western Europe, Canada, Latin

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

616

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

[97:3

place to this day: the EAA of 1979 expressly states that exports should
be restricted “only after full consideration of the impact on the economy
of the United States and only to the extent necessary” to achieve the
statute’s goals of protecting national security and furthering U.S. foreign
61
policy.
A defining feature of modern U.S. export controls, therefore, is the
tension between a strong desire to promote exports (consistent with the
United States’ historical preference for trade) and the desire to prevent
62
or oversee problematic transactions.
This tension holds particular
importance for the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls, because
efforts to promote exports (and reduce export licensing requirements)
have led to there being more items located outside the United States
over which the United States asserts jurisdiction (usually because these
63
items are of U.S. origin or contain U.S. content). In this way, the
potential for disagreement and conflicts between the United States and
64
its trading partners is increased.
3. Recent U.S. Developments
Efforts by the Obama Administration to double U.S. exports over
65
five years (2009 to 2014) and to simplify the licensing structure for U.S.
America and Asia.”).
61. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2). For a discussion of the background leading up to the
enactment of the EAA of 1979 and its conflicting goals of promoting trade and using trade as
a foreign policy tool, see Abbott, supra note 4, at 741–45. It is worth pointing out that the
EAA of 1979 lists other policy goals as well—namely, preventing the export of items
identified as being in short domestic supply and preventing the export of items in support of
terrorism—but these goals can be viewed as more specific subsets of the broader national
security and foreign policy goals of the statute. Indeed, it has been observed that even the
statute’s national security and foreign policy goals are largely interchangeable for practical
purposes. See ROOT, LIEBMAN & THOMSEN, supra note 29, § 4.1.1; Abbott, supra note 4, at
744–47.
62. For further discussion of the difficult balance between export promotion and
prevention of problematic export transactions, see generally Bowman, supra note 9, at 325.
63. For a detailed discussion of the EAR’s jurisdictional origin requirements, see infra
text accompanying notes 71–78.
64. The Obama Administration’s current efforts at export promotion also ignore (as
have previous efforts at export control reform) central structural deficiencies in the U.S.
system of regulating exports. For discussion of those structural problems and suggested
solutions, see Bowman, supra note 9, at 319; Gregory W. Bowman, The U.S. Export Control
Reforms of 2009–2014: Good Answers to Incomplete Questions, available at
http://ssrn.com/author=400520.
65. TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMM., 2011 NATIONAL EXPORT
STRATEGY: POWERING THE NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE 3 (2011), available at
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66

export controls further illustrate the American preference for
facilitating outbound trade.
The licensing simplification efforts
underway are badly needed: the broad consensus within the U.S.
government and the private sector is that U.S. export controls are too
67
complex, too riddled with inconsistencies caused by incremental
68
modifications, too restrictive of exports of items with military origins
69
but widespread commercial applications, and too balkanized in terms
http://trade.gov/publications/pdfs/nes2011FINAL.pdf (“So tonight, we set a new goal: We will
double our exports over the next five years . . . .” (quoting Barack Obama, President of the
United States, State of the Union Address (January 27, 2010))).
66. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on the
President’s Export Control Reform Initiative (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-presidents-export-control-reform-initia
tive (outlining a streamlined licensing process, clearer export classification scheme, and more
clear-cut demarcations of interagency jurisdiction).
67. See id. Specifically, the White House’s press release stated as follows:
The assessment found that the current U.S. export control system does not
sufficiently reduce national security risk based on the fact that its structure is overly
complicated, contains too many redundancies, and tries to protect too much.
The current system is based on two different control lists administered by two
different departments, three different primary licensing agencies (none of whom
sees the others licenses), a multitude of enforcement agencies with overlapping and
duplicative authorities, and a number of separate information technology systems
(none of which are accessible to or easily compatible with the other), or agencies
with no IT system at all that issue licenses. The fragmented system, combined with
the extensive list of controlled items which resulted in almost 130,000 licenses last
year, dilutes our ability to adequately control and protect those key items and
technologies that must be protected for our national security.
Id.; see also Ronald J. Sievert, Urgent Message to Congress—The Case for Immediate Reform
of Our Outdated, Ineffective, and Self-Defeating Export Control System, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89,
92–93 (2002); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama
Announces First Steps Toward Implementation of New U.S. Export Control System (Dec. 9,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obamaannounces-first-steps-toward-implementation-new-us-expor (“Rebuilding the two U.S. export
control lists—which currently have completely different structures, take different approaches
to defining controlled products, and are administered by two different departments—is the
cornerstone of the reform effort because all other aspects of our system are contingent upon
what we control.”); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House
Chief of Staff Daley Highlights Priority for the President’s Export Control Reform Initiative
(Jul. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release, Chief of Staff Daley], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/19/white-house-chief-staff-daley-highlight
s-priority-presidents-export-cont (same); About Export Control Reform, EXPORT.GOV (Oct.
22, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_047329.asp (same).
68. Sievert, supra note 67, at 93.
69. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Release of
National Security Report on Revising U.S. Export Controls on Satellites (Apr. 18, 2012),
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of which U.S. agencies have jurisdiction over what export activities.
Because of its focus on export promotion, this reform effort further
underscores the importance of trying to resolve the issues raised by the
extraterritorial scope of U.S. export control laws.
D. The Structure of U.S. Export Controls: Licensing and Jurisdiction
The topic of prescriptive jurisdiction of U.S. export control laws is
inextricably intertwined with that of U.S. export licensing, because the
United States only takes export control enforcement action against
activities over which it claims jurisdiction. A brief summary of the
licensing and penalty schemes of U.S. export controls is therefore
necessary in order to fully appreciate the impact of the United States’
expansive export control jurisdictional claims.
1. U.S. Export Control Licensing Structure and Penalties
A key structural characteristic of U.S. export controls under the
EAA of 1979 and EAR is that the primary focus is on the identity and
origin of the goods, software, and technologies (again, collectively
71
referred to as “items”) being exported. The EAR apply to the export
of civilian and “dual use” items—commercial items that can be used for

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/18/fact-sheet-releasenational-security-report-revising-us-export-controls (“Over the past 15 years, a substantial
number of commercial satellite systems, subsystems, components, and related technologies
have become less critical to national security due to the transition from military to
predominantly civilian uses . . . . As a result, U.S. export controls over these items should
reflect their decreased sensitivity while still ensuring that they cannot be used to significantly
improve the military capabilities of another country.”); see also Sievert, supra note 67, at 93;
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Lays the
Foundation for a New Export Control System to Strengthen National Security and the
Competitiveness of Key U.S. Manufacturing and Technology Sectors (Aug. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter
Press
Release,
Obama
Lays
the
Foundation],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/30/president-obama-lays-foundation-a-ne
w-export-control-system-strengthen-n (listing different prospective tiers for items that have
dual military and commercial uses).
70. See Press Release, Obama Lays the Foundation, supra note 69 (outlining the
splintering of agencies, control lists, and IT systems involved in the current U.S. export
control system); see also Sievert, supra note 67, at 95–96; Press Release, Chief of Staff Daley,
supra note 67 (“[T]he current export control system is overly complicated and
fragmented . . . .”).
71. The term “item” is in fact a defined technical term in the EAR. See Export
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining “Item” to mean
“commodities, software, and technology”).
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72

civilian uses or sensitive military uses. These items comprise the vast
73
majority of U.S. and global trade activity. The EAR’s classification
and licensing scheme is generally harmonized (by consensus) with those
of the forty other countries that currently participate in the Wassenaar
74
Arrangement. The result is that while particular licensing decisions
will differ to an extent among these countries, this approach to export
75
This partially
classification and licensing is broadly shared.
harmonized approach holds important implications for the
recommendations made later in this Article.
In terms of licensing mechanics, the EAR contain a classification
scheme called the “Commerce Control List,” which identifies various
“commodities, software, and technology” that may be of concern for
76
U.S. export control purposes. Depending on how a particular item is
classified on this list, what its country of ultimate destination is, and
what countries the item may pass through on its way to that destination,
77
the item may or may not require an export license. Items not listed on

72. Id. (defining “Dual Use” to mean “[i]tems that have both commercial and military or
proliferation applications”).
73. See id. § 734.3 (listing “[i]tems [s]ubject to the EAR”); BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC.,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, KNOW THE FACTS BEFORE YOU SHIP: A GUIDE TO EXPORT
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 2 (2013), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/formsdocuments/doc_view/286-licensing-faq (noting that “[t]he EAR regulate the export and
reexport of most commercial items”).
74. Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Techs., Participating States, WASSENAAR.ORG, http://www.wassenaar.org/particip
ants/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
75. Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Techs., supra note 11.
76. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1. Under current U.S. export control regulations, commodities,
software, and technology are commonly referred to collectively as “items.” Id.; see also
Bowman, supra note 9, at 334. Software did not exist as a commercial article of commerce in
1949 when the ECA of 1949 was enacted, and in fact neither the EAA of 1969 nor the EAA
of 1979 mentioned “software” as an article of commerce to be controlled. Rather, these
statutes spoke only in terms of “goods” and “technology.” The EAA of 1979’s language is
broad and generalized enough, however, to cover software as either a “good” or
“technology.” In any event, the current U.S. Export Administration Regulations do expressly
cover “software.” See § 772.1 (defining “Software”). For a more detailed discussion, see
Bowman, supra note 9, at 334–35.
77. See 15 C.F.R. § 732.1; see also Bowman, supra note 9, at 332–33. The EAR quite
literally use a chart to clarify when an export license is required based on an item’s
classification and its destination, with countries of destination listed as rows, and items’
reasons for control (foreign policy, national security, antiterrorism) listed as columns. An
“X” at the intersection of a country’s row and an item’s reasons for control means that a
license is required. See 15 C.F.R. § 738, Supp. 1 (2013).
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the EAR’s Commerce Control List do not require U.S. export licenses
unless they are (a) exported to destinations subject to U.S. trade
sanctions or (b) exported to “end-users” or for “end-uses” identified as
problematic under the EAR—that is, to prohibited parties or in support
of activities identified as undesirable in the EAR, including
nonproliferation activities and missile technology-related activities that
78
pose serious foreign policy or national security concerns.
Both civil and criminal penalties are possible for violations of U.S.
79
export control laws and regulations, but criminal investigations and
80
criminal penalties are rare. Fines are common when the party is a U.S.
national or party in the United States, but the most common penalty
imposed against parties outside the United States is the denial of export
privileges and the adding of the party to the EAR’s “Denied Persons
List,” which lists parties who are not permitted to engage in transactions
81
subject to the EAR. This denial of export privileges has important
implications for the topic of export control jurisdiction: per section
431(1) of the Restatement (Third), which concerns enforcement
jurisdiction, states may use “nonjudicial measures to induce or compel
compliance, or punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations”—
82
provided, of course, that prescriptive jurisdiction is lawful. The key
question, therefore, is not about the penalty itself—it is about the
78. Id. § 732.1; see also id. § 744.1. Until 1995, the presumption was listed the other way
around, although broad “general licenses” allowed a good number of exports without further
clearance or approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce. This structure was largely
driven by the export-restriction focus of the ECA of 1949 and regulations promulgated
thereunder. However, “general licenses” had rendered so many exports permissible within
this scheme that it was decided to reverse the presumption. See Export Administration
Regulation: Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714 (Mar.
25, 1996) (providing for reform and simplification of U.S. Export Administration
Regulations). In one sense this was a semantic change that had little immediate effect—but
in another important sense it was a tacit admission of how far export controls had shifted
from presumptively restrictive to presumptively permissive.
79. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (setting forth civil and criminal penalties for violations of these
regulations).
80. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 9 (2011) (only 39 criminal convictions in 2011).
81. The Denied Persons List, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/the-denied-persons-list (last visited May 9, 2014); see also
The Denied Persons List Standard Order, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND
SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/content/article/12-policy-guidance/li
st-parties-of-concern/321-the-denied-persons-list-standard-order (last visited Feb. 5, 2014)
(setting forth standard terms of denial orders).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 431(1).
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legality of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export controls. The entire
analysis boils down to a question of jurisdictional propriety.
2. The Diminished Importance of the Export Control Licensing
Structure
Three primary aspects of this licensing structure are centrally
relevant to the expansive jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls.
First, item classification remains a central, structural aspect of U.S.
export controls, as well as of its trading partners (because of
harmonization and coordination through the Wassenaar Arrangement),
but it has become harder to categorize items as clearly problematic or
nonproblematic based on their export classification.
83

Many items have been “decontrolled” in order to promote exports,
and in fact the vast majority of items subject to the EAR are not
84
Similar
expressly listed on the EAR’s Commerce Control List.
decontrols have been implemented by other countries that participate in
85
the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, the increasing sophistication
of commercial articles means that quite ordinary items, such as
86
computers, can be used for problematic purposes.
In short, even
though the entire licensing system is built on export classification,
export classification is in fact no longer terribly important to the system
87
overall.
Second, since the end of the Cold War, it has become harder to
categorize export destinations as clearly problematic or non-problematic.

83. Id.
84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-197R, ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR
EXPORTS REGULATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 6 (2006) [hereinafter GAO
EXPORT DATA ANALYSIS]. One observer noted dryly that “[i]f only $1 billion of the $625
billion worth of regulated exports [in 2005] received an ECCN [Export Control Classification
Number] while the vast majority receive EAR99 classification, the catchall provision is the
standard, and the classification scheme is the exception.” Jordan Collins, Same Laws,
Different Century: The Bureau of Industry & Security’s Role in Global Trade & National
Security, 15 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 108, 120 (2006).
85. See BUREAU FOR INDUS. & SEC., JUNE 2010 AMENDMENTS TO THE ENCRYPTION
PROVISIONS OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS 2 (2010).
86. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 320–28.
87. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 738.2, 774.1 (2013) (listing the
control status of personal computers to various destinations, and demonstrating that export
licenses are not required to most destinations).
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Exports to the Soviet Union during the Cold War were by definition
problematic (although sometimes approved); exports to Russia today
are not. In like fashion, the export of a personal computer to India (a
country generally on good terms with the United States) may or may not
be problematic—and the same is true for the export of that computer to
88
Egypt, or the United Kingdom, or almost anywhere else. Destination
is no longer a useful proxy for deciding whether an export transaction is
problematic.
Third—and following directly from the previous two points—the
formal structure of item classification and destination has been largely
superseded by a focus on end-use and end-user concerns.
In the 1990s, the United States implemented the “Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative” (EPCI), which imposed licensing
requirements on all exports (regardless of item classification or
destination) that raised concerns about the end-use of the items
89
involved or the foreign end-users of these items. This end-use/end-user
focus carries enormous implications for the jurisdictional reach of U.S.
export controls, because the effectiveness of end-use/end-user controls
is directly related to the breadth of jurisdictional reach. It is also
important because unlike the mechanics of U.S. extraterritorial
jurisdiction, nonproliferation is a goal generally shared among trading
90
nations.
To summarize, the modern U.S. export control licensing system
consists of end-use and end-user controls that have been grafted onto a
preexisting system of export licensing. Through the harmonization
efforts of the Wassenaar Arrangement, this licensing system is quite
similar in structure to the export licensing systems of other U.S. trading
91
partners. The overall effect is that export compliance determinations
(both in the United States and other countries) now largely depend not
88. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
89. Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on
Technology Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 492
(2003); Daniel H. Joyner, The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative: National Security
Necessity or Unconstitutionally Vague?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 109–11 (2004). The
EPCI provisions are currently located in §§ 744.1–.6 of the EAR.
90. See e.g., The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Tech., The Wassenaar Arrangement, WASSENAAR.ORG,
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/whatis.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
91. Id.
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on the identity (classification) of an item or on its destination, but rather
on ad hoc “end-use” and “end-user” assessments that focus on the
92
purpose of the export. And the United States claims jurisdiction over
activities abroad based on the U.S. origin or U.S. content of the items
93
involved —a basis that has little to do with the underlying concerns at
hand.
Moreover, this U.S. export licensing approach, combined with the
United States’ broad jurisdictional reach, makes it far more likely that
exports (or reexports) can be undertaken without a U.S. license, only to
discover, at some later point in time, that concerns exist about the
purpose (end-use or end-user) of the export—and that a U.S. license is
therefore required for further activity, or should have been obtained for
previous activity. Stated differently, it makes it far more likely that
activities abroad could be subject to U.S. export control jurisdiction and
enforcement on the basis that the items involved in those activities are—
and always have been—subject to U.S. export control jurisdiction.
This is a rather astonishing state of affairs—but as the following
discussion clearly illustrates, modern U.S. export controls did not start
out with such broad extraterritorial reach. Instead, extraterritoriality
became more important as the effectiveness of U.S. export controls
diminished in the decades after World War II.
The rise of
extraterritoriality in U.S. export controls, and the reasons therefor, offer
useful insights into the current jurisdictional approach and the
possibilities for new approaches.
3. The Expanded Importance of Export Jurisdiction
a. U.S. Export Jurisdiction Immediately Following World War II
At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as the
world’s leading economic power and leading provider of technological
94
and commercial innovation. Europe’s infrastructure had been largely
decimated during the war, and the Soviet Union and Japan had suffered
enormous losses as well. In addition, China’s global economic clout had
95
not yet developed. While the United States was not the sole source of

92. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
94. See CUPITT, supra note 52, at 47 (discussing the United States’ concern with
maintaining its technological superiority in following years).
95. JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., THE CHINA MIRACLE: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND
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items of strategic concern, it was certainly the largest by far —and that
meant that if the United States wanted to prevent the flow of certain
sensitive goods and technologies to the Soviet Union or China, it largely
could do so by refusing to approve exports of these items from the
97
United States to those destinations. It was thus feasible for the United
States to implement its national security and foreign policy goals
through an export control regime that was characterized by relatively
little extraterritoriality.
The effectiveness of these direct restrictions on exports to the SinoSoviet bloc was enhanced by additional U.S. legislation intended to
encourage U.S. trading partners to implement similar export
98
restrictions, as well as by the formation of the seven-member
Consultative Group (which included, as a sub-entity, the better-known
99
Coordinating Committee, or COCOM). The Coordinating Committee
coordinated anticommunist export controls among the United States,
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
100
Kingdom—with the United States setting much of the tone and policy.
ECONOMIC REFORM 25 (2003) (discussing the rapid economic development in China that
began in the late 1970s); Marion Chyun-Yang Wang, Greater China: Powerhouse of East
Asian Regional Cooperation, 21 E. ASIA 38, 39 (2004) (discussing China’s economic growth
since the late 1970s due to highly regulated international trade and investment).
96. Berman & Garson, supra note 55, at 834–35.
97. It is worth noting that diversion concerns (exports diverted from the stated
destination to a covert ultimate destination) were as much a concern during that era as they
are in modern times, but end-use/end-user controls (which today are used to address
diversion concerns) were not formalized as separate elements of the U.S. export control
licensing scheme until the 1990s. Instead, diversion concerns were addressed within the
license application process for individual transactions: if such concerns were present, the
export license application could be denied or issued in a restricted form modified to address
these concerns.
98. See Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611–13(c)
(repealed 1979). This act, popularly known as the Battle Act, set forth the U.S. policy “that
no military, economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies
an embargo on such shipments to any nation or combination of nations threatening the
security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all
countries under its domination.” Id. § 1611.
99. Berman & Garson, supra note 55, at 834–35. The Consultative Group originally
included two committees charged with coordinating these export policies: The Coordinating
Committee (COCOM), which focused on the Soviet bloc, and the China Committee, which
focused on Mainland China and North Korea. The committees were subsequently merged by
disbanding the China Committee and folding its functions into COCOM. Id.
100. Id.; Silverstone, supra note 55, at 343–46. COCOM was disbanded after the end of
the Cold War to be replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. See HIRSCHHORN, supra note
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The United States’ economic primacy meant that if it wanted to coerce a
trading partner to take (or not take) certain actions, it could impose, ex
ante, stricter export licensing requirements or conditions on certain
exports to that country, or ease these controls as a reward for
101
cooperation.
Such restrictions could preclude certain uses or
reexports of the covered items, once they were abroad. Figure 1
illustrates this post-war state of affairs.
Figure 1

29, at xxiii. For discussions and analyses of the Wassenaar Arrangement, see Gregory Wells
Bowman, Carol George, Sunwinder Mann & Alison Stafford Powell, International Trade
Aspects of Information Technology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LAW 4023 (Stephen Saxby ed., 2003); Bowman, supra note 9, at 346–47; The Wassenaar
Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs.,
supra note 11. Current Wassenaar Arrangement members are Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. See The Wassenaar Arrangement
on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., supra note 74.
101. Bridge, supra note 14, at 3–4 (noting the United States’ policy to place trade
restrictions, even on its allies, to promote its own political agenda).
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With the United States as the primary source of supply for many
sensitive goods and technologies, and with some coordination of export
controls among key U.S. trading partners, U.S.-led export controls
essentially exerted a global effect simply by regulating what was
exported physically from the United States and placing ex ante
restrictions on the use of exported items. The jurisdictional reach of
U.S. export controls did not need to extend much beyond the actual
borders of the United States. And for “U.S. persons” located abroad (a
102
term of art that includes both natural persons and corporate entities),
the United States could impose such restrictions after exportation, using
the U.S. citizenship of these U.S. persons or entities as justification for
such jurisdiction. The effect of nationality jurisdiction on the scope of
U.S. export control jurisdiction is shown in Figure 2 below.

102. The definitional scope of “U.S. persons” or “persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States” has been an enormously contentious issue among the United States and its
trading partners, and was indeed an issue in the Trans-Siberian pipeline controversy discussed
below. However, assuming that a definition of “U.S. person” could be agreed upon, there
was little dispute that the United States could assert nationality jurisdiction over such U.S.
persons abroad. In fact, after some definitional disputes between the United States and its
European trading partners, the United States did adopt a more limited—and thus less
controversial—definition of “U.S. person” in trade sanctions programs implemented pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07 (IEEPA),
beginning with the Libyan trade sanctions in 1986. This limited definition made it clear that
foreign-owned or -controlled subsidiaries of U.S. companies were not U.S. persons subject to
these U.S. laws and regulations. See Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 560.314 (2013); Libyan Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R. § 570.313 (2013).
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Figure 2

In short, the United States could use these approaches to influence and
regulate exports from the United States, and reexports of those items
from abroad, in a fairly effective manner. From a legal perspective,
these approaches were not controversial, provided that the United
103
States did not define “U.S. Persons” too expansively. Stated in terms
of the Restatement (Third), the United States was exercising export
control jurisdiction over exports from the United States under the
104
subjective territorial principle, and exercising jurisdiction over the
105
activities of U.S. persons abroad pursuant to the nationality principle.

103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note
(noting that it has long been “accepted that a state had jurisdiction to exercise its authority
within its territory and with respect to its nationals abroad”).
104. See id. §§ 402–03.
105. See id.
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Additionally, broad effect could be achieved through the consensual (if
106
somewhat coerced) cooperation of U.S. trading partners.
b. The Declining Effectiveness of Direct U.S. Export Controls: Pandora’s
Box
Over the decades following the end of World War II, the
effectiveness of U.S. export controls fundamentally changed in several
important respects. First, U.S. global dominance eroded, as other
countries began to catch up to the United States in terms of industrial
107
production and R&D capability. While the United States continued to
maintain dominance in many cutting-edge industries, more established
industries such as steel production, automotive production and design,
and consumer electronics production gradually moved overseas, in
whole or in part, as the absolute or comparative advantage balance
108
among countries shifted.
This shift of industry overseas meant that
direct U.S. export controls were less effective at preventing the flow of
sensitive items to the Soviet bloc or China (or other undesired
destinations). Not only were more industries located overseas, but in
many cases nationality jurisdiction could not readily be extended to
cover these activities because no U.S. citizens or companies were
involved. Yet these foreign activities in many cases raised significant
U.S. national security or foreign policy concerns. While these activities
were outside the traditional subjective territorial or nationality
jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls, the United States

106. Some commentators did point out, with concern, that the broad language of the
ECA of 1949 and regulations promulgated thereunder could lead to overly broad assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States. See Berman & Garson, supra note 55, at
850–51. The United States did not expressly make such assertions, however, until 1982. See
infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
107. See William H. Branson et al., Trends in the United States International Trade and
Investment since World War II, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 183, 183, 185–
86 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1980) (describing how the strength of the post-war economies in
other nations reduced the United States’ share of economic output in the world); see also
TYLER COWEN & ALEX TABARROK, MODERN PRINCIPLES: MACROECONOMICS 118–19
(2010) (discussing how Germany and Japan grew faster than the United States and were
highly productive in the period after World War II).
108. Industries might be conceptualized as moving along a spectrum. On the right side,
new industries would emerge (often through the result of U.S. R&D), and for a time the
United States would enjoy an absolute or comparative advantage in those industries. As
these industries became more established, however, they would move further to the left of the
spectrum. Other countries would make headway in those industries, and the United States’
absolute or comparative advantages would shift to other, newer industries.

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

629

nonetheless had a strategic interest in regulating and restricting these
activities.
Second, as the digital age dawned in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it
became harder to draw a clear line between items that could be used
only for generally benign end-uses and dual use items that also could be
109
used for problematic end-uses.
The quintessential example is the
110
personal computer, as discussed above; other examples abound,
111
The
including cellular phones and computer operating software.
blurring of the line between benign items and potentially problematic
items meant that it became far more difficult to draw a clear distinction
between desirable export transactions and problematic export
transactions. One eventual result was a greater focus on end-use and
end-user controls, as discussed above; but another result was that as
restrictions on exports were lowered—because such items were not
clearly “bad” and because a key goal was to promote exports—the need
for broader reach to stop unwanted uses of such items once they were
abroad became greater.
Thus, the combination of these two factors—multilateralization of
supply and the growing preeminence of dual use items—meant that
there were more foreign activities that the United States might want to
regulate or restrict for national security or foreign policy purposes.
Moreover, the determination of whether such foreign activities were
desirable depended far less on the nature (classification) of the items
involved or the location of the transaction, and far more on the specific
end-use to which the items would be put, as well as on the end-users
who would be involved in the transactions.
These developments might have mattered less if the United States’
foreign trading partners were fully willing to coordinate their
international trade decisions with the strategic concerns of the United
States. In the decades that followed World War II, however, the United
States’ European trading partners grew less willing to follow the United
States’ lead in matters of foreign policy and national security, especially
109. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 333–34. The term “dual use” has come to be a
synonym for civilian items. Id.; see also Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1
(2013) (defining “Dual Use” and acknowledging that the term is regularly used, in general
parlance, to refer to civilian items).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 83–87.
111. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (defining “Dual use” as “[i]tems that have both commercial and
military or proliferation applications. While this term is used informally to describe items
that are subject to the EAR, purely commercial items are also subject to the EAR.”).
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when the choice involved forgoing economic benefit.
That is not to
say there was no cooperation, for clearly there was strong trans-Atlantic
113
coordination of economic controls aimed at communist containment.
Yet what might happen when, in a specific export-related transaction,
European strategic and economic interests were directly contrary to the
economic and strategic interests of the United States (or at least seen as
such by European countries)? And what if the transaction in question
was one of the many over which the United States could not adequately
exercise export control jurisdiction under existing international law
principles of territoriality or nationality? The result in one case, the
trans-Siberian pipeline controversy of 1981–1982, led the United States
to claim unprecedented extraterritoriality over transactions outside the
United States.
E. The Trans-Siberian Pipeline Controversy of 1981–1982
By the early 1980s, the stage was set for a crisis in U.S. export
controls: either the controls would not work and would have to be
forgone in favor of other means of achieving U.S. national security or
foreign policy objectives, or the jurisdictional reach of the controls
would have to be expanded. In 1981 and 1982, the latter option was
chosen by President Ronald Reagan during the trans-Siberian pipeline
controversy—an event that ranks as one of the great international trade
disputes of the latter twentieth century. Because of the event’s
complexity and its importance to U.S. export control jurisdiction, it is
114
discussed here in some detail.
As Andreas Lowenfeld has concisely observed, there were two
primary aspects to the dispute: contracts between Western European
entities and the Soviet Union for the construction of the pipeline, and a

112. See CUPITT, supra note 52, at 96–109. For a discussion of early U.S. trade disputes
with other countries regarding extraterritorial export controls, see Kenneth W. Abbott,
Defining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Export Controls: Congress as Catalyst, 17
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 79, 90–91 (1984).
113. This, of course, was a key purpose of COCOM. See Abbott, supra note 112.
114. For other expositions of this trade controversy and other trade controversies of the
1970s and 1980s, see Monroe Leigh, The Long Arm of Uncle Sam—US Controls as Applied to
Foreign Persons and Transactions, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND
RESPONSES THERETO 47 (1984); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14; Abbott, supra note 112, at
82–90; Bridge, supra note 14; see also AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 77TH
ANNUAL MEETING 1, 241–70 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1983) (providing a transcript of a panel
discussion on the extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls).
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115

crackdown on Solidarity-led reforms in Poland.
With respect to the
former aspect, in the early 1980s, European natural gas distribution
companies signed contracts with the Soviet Union for the construction
116
of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Germany.
The pipeline
project was a way for the Soviet Union to earn much-needed hard
currency, and also was a way for European countries to reduce
dependency on Middle Eastern oil and provide employment for
117
unemployed European steel workers. The total value of the project to
these West European countries was between U.S. $11 billion and U.S.
118
The United States, of course, was concerned that the
$15 billion.
pipeline would provide the Soviet Union with hard Western currency
and that reduced European dependency on Middle Eastern oil would
119
mean greater dependency on Soviet natural gas.
Some U.S. companies were slated to supply technology or
120
equipment in support of this project. The United States had recently
completed its Alaskan pipeline, and U.S. companies involved in that
project had developed technology and technological know-how that
121
would be highly useful on the trans-Siberian pipeline project.
As a
result, several European corporations serving as sub-contractors or
contractors for the trans-Siberian pipeline project had signed
agreements to purchase equipment and license relevant technology from
122
these U.S. companies. Some European subsidiaries of U.S. companies
were also providing support of various types to the trans-Siberian

115. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361; see also Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14; Eric S.
O’Malley, Destabilization Policy: Lessons from Reagan on International Law, Revolutions and
Dealing with Pariah Nations, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 319, 351–52 (2003).
116. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361.
117. Id.; see also Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology
Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 619 n.227 (1999).
118. ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 819 (2d ed. 1999); Patrizio
Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dispute—A Compelling Case for the Adoption of
Jurisdictional Codes of Conduct, 8 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 2 (1984) (“The whole project
represents a $15 billion investment . . . .”).
119. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361; Morse & Powers, supra note 14, at 538; Moyer &
Mabry, supra note 14, at 70.
120. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361 (noting that General, Electric, Caterpillar Tractor,
and other companies had entered into contracts with several European companies that were
helping to build the pipeline).
121. Id.
122. See supra note 117.
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123

pipeline project. These European subsidiaries of U.S. companies were
in the possession of relevant U.S. origin pipeline-related technology that
124
previously had been lawfully exported from the United States.
With respect to the latter aspect of this trade dispute—the Solidarity
Movement in Poland—in late 1981, martial law was declared in Poland
125
as a means to stifle the Solidarity Movement.
Up to that point,
Solidarity had enjoyed remarkable success in weakening the Communist
Party’s grip on government in Poland and achieving some semblance of
126
democratic reform. Western European countries decried the situation
in Poland but took little action; in contrast, U.S. President Reagan
implemented stricter export controls against Poland and the Soviet
Union (which was believed to be behind the imposition of martial law in
127
Poland).
The restrictions imposed by the United States were
implemented in two phases—one in December 1981 and one in June
1982—and they took three general forms: (a) territory-based restrictions
on exports from the United States, directly or indirectly (i.e., via third
countries), in support of the pipeline project; (b) nationality-based
restrictions on “persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”;
and (c) ex post restrictions on reexports or use abroad of U.S.-origin or
128
-content items previously lawfully exported from the United States.
The first two types of restrictions were consistent with prior U.S.
practice and with international law; the third was newer and
129
controversial.

123. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361 (“[A] number of European subsidiaries of
American companies were engaged in portions of the project.”).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 361–62.
126. Id. at 361 (“For sixteen months, freedom in Poland seemed to grow day by day.
Close to ten million people joined Solidarity, a related movement arose among Poland’s
farmers, and even the Central Committee of the Communist Party held free elections by
secret ballot, with the result that only one-tenth of the membership was reelected.”).
127. Abbott, supra note 112, at 82–84.
128. Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 11.
129. It is important to point out that these U.S. actions were trade-restrictive, and thus
very much like an embargo. That is especially the case with the nationality-based restrictions
imposed on U.S. parties. This illustrates that, as discussed earlier in this Article, there is
overlap between export controls and trade sanctions (embargoes)—but the point to bear in
mind is that item origin-based restrictions were imposed through the EAR, then lifted. They
were, in other words, a case of embargo activity being channeled through the EAR, which
does happen, and not a case of the overall trade-promotion focus of the EAR being
subverted. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 746 (2013) (Embargoes and
Other Special Controls); see also supra text accompanying notes 78–81.
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1. The December 1981 Restrictions
The December 1981 phase restrictions contained several elements.
First, the United States prohibited the export from the United States of
130
all items for use on the pipeline project.
This was done by
implementing stricter export licensing requirements for the export of oil
and natural gas transmission and refining equipment and technology to
the Soviet Union, and by suspending the review and issuance of any
131
such licenses. Second, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced
that previously issued licenses for exports to the Soviet Union could be
reviewed and suspended, and this exerted a strong chilling effect on
132
exports under those licenses.
Third, the December 1981 phase conditioned all exports (to
anywhere) of oil and gas transmission technology upon an ex ante
“written assurance” by the foreign recipient that it would not reexport
or otherwise provide either this technology or any “direct products” of
this technology (that is, goods manufactured abroad directly from this
133
technology) to the Soviet Union.
Failure to provide such a written
assurance would mean an export license would be required for the
134
export (which likely would not be granted). In essence, this restriction
was intended to prevent any indirect exports in support of the pipeline
project, as well as prevent the export of technology that, while not for
export to the Soviet Union, would be used to produce certain foreign135
origin items that would be used on the pipeline project.
Finally, although it is not readily apparent from the language of the
December 1981 phase restrictions, these controls in fact also restricted
the reexport from abroad of goods and technology that previously had
136
been lawfully exported from the United States. This was so because
the EAR permitted (and in fact still generally permit) reexports from
abroad of items that would not require a license for export directly from

130. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 82–84; Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 362.
131. Abbott, supra note 112, at 82–83.
132. Id. at 83–84.
133. Id. at 85–86; Leigh, supra note 114, at 50 (“In accordance with this broad policy, the
Commerce Department in December 1981 announced regulations which barred all exports or
re-exports to the Soviet Union of US-origin commodities and technical data for transmission
or refinement of petroleum or natural gas for energy usage.”).
134. Abbott, supra note 112, at 85–86.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 84–85.
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137

the United States.
However, because the December 1981 phase
restrictions imposed an export license requirement on exports from the
United States of oil and natural gas transmission and refining equipment
and technology, that also meant that foreign reexports of these items
would require an export license, regardless of the fact that originally
138
these items had been lawfully exported from the United States. This
was, in other words, an ex post or retroactive restriction on reexports.
As Stanley Marcuss and Eric Richard have observed, the broad
statutory language of the EAA of 1979 did not clearly prohibit such
retroactive application of U.S. export controls, but it was certainly out of
139
the ordinary.
Historically, reexport restrictions under the EAR had
140
been applied by the United States on an ex ante, not ex post, basis.
Harold Berman and John Garson made the same observation in 1967
concerning the ECA of 1949 and export controls promulgated
141
thereunder.
The upshot is that prior to the Soviet pipeline
controversy, application of U.S. export control restrictions to items
previously exported lawfully from the United States had never been
attempted, or even envisioned. Since 1981 and 1982, however, this
approach has become a permanent and prevalent feature of U.S. export
controls.
The December 1981 phase restrictions were generally unpopular
with the United States’ European trading partners (as well as with
adversely affected U.S. companies), but they did not lead to an
international relations crisis between the United States and its Western
142
European trading partners.
Indeed, France and Great Britain

137. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 736.2 (2013) (defining the scope of
EAR export prohibitions—and, by implication, permissible exports—in terms of “exports”
and “reexports”).
138. Abbott, supra note 112, at 84–85.
139. Stanley J. Marcuss & Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States
Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 439, 475–76
(1981).
140. See id. at 439.
141. See generally Berman & Garson, supra note 55.
142. See Steven Rattner, Britain Defying U.S. Restriction in Soviet Project, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1982, at A1 (“The embargo in the terms in which it has been imposed is an attempt to
interfere with existing contracts and is an unacceptable extension of American extraterritorial
jurisdiction in a way which is repugnant in international law.” (quoting Lord Cockfield, Trade
Secretary) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Compressors Leave Le Havre for Soviet, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at D1 (discussing France’s response).
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generally—albeit somewhat reluctantly—supported the restrictions.
This phase’s ex ante restrictions on exports, future reexports, and foreign
use of items exported from the United States were lawful exercises of
144
territorial jurisdiction by the United States, and the ex post reexport
restrictions, troubling though they may have been, appear not to have
had enough impact to lead to a serious escalation in trans-Atlantic trade
tensions.
2. The June 1982 Restrictions
In contrast, the export control restrictions imposed by the United
States in June 1982 did draw the ire of Western European states. The
June 1982 phase restrictions were put in place unilaterally by the United
States, after the United States’ December 1981 phase restrictions proved
insufficient, and after U.S. efforts to implement multilateral trade
restrictions against the Soviet Union failed due to a divergence of U.S.
145
and European interests and concerns over the pipeline project.
The
June 1982 phase restrictions expanded the December 1981 phase
restrictions in two important ways.
First, the United States prohibited the use on the trans-Siberian
pipeline project of equipment manufactured by foreign subsidiaries of
146
U.S. companies.
This move, while unpopular, was not per se inconsistent with
international law: depending on how the term “U.S. subsidiary” was
147
defined, this was an exercise of nationality jurisdiction.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Abbott, supra note 112, at 87–88.
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 362.
Abbott, supra note 112, at 86–87.
Id., at 86–87; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 70; Leigh, supra note 114, at 50–51.
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 362–63. Lowenfeld has observed that this:

[A]ssertion of jurisdiction . . . was not new; it had been asserted by the United
States in the past in order to frustrate evasion of U.S. embargoes against China,
Cuba, and other countries designated under the Trading with the Enemy Act [a U.S.
trade sanctions statute] and its successor statute, though not under export controls.
Id. at 363. Lowenfeld’s observation is that the subject of export control restrictions on foreign
subsidiaries was “a subject of continuing controversy between the United States and its allies,
neither clearly supported by nor clearly contrary to international law.” Id.
This particular controversy has been largely resolved in the export control context by the
United States’ adoption of a definition of “U.S. person” that effectively narrows the scope of
nationality jurisdiction asserted. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1
(2013) (defining “U.S. person”). A similar approach has been taken under U.S. trade

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

636

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

[97:3

Second, the United States prohibited the use on the pipeline project
of equipment manufactured abroad by non-U.S. companies or
subsidiaries using U.S. technology that previously had been licensed
148
from U.S. companies.
At the time the June 1982 phase restrictions were implemented,
several foreign companies (including some foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies) had contracts with the Soviet Union for the manufacture
and delivery of equipment for the trans-Siberian pipeline project, and
already had licensed U.S.-origin technology for the production of this
149
The June 1982 phase restrictions,
equipment from U.S. companies.
therefore, effectively prohibited these foreign companies from
150
performing under their supply contracts with the Soviet Union.
In
response, Britain and France ordered companies within their borders to
disregard these U.S. restrictions and continue working on the pipeline
151
project.
This second restriction may seem at first blush to be problematic but
ultimately narrow.
In fact, it was a radical expansion of the
jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls, and one that has become an
increasingly central feature of these controls. At its core, the restriction
was a retroactive restriction on the use abroad of technology that
previously had been lawfully exported from the United States and
sanctions programs since the 1980s. See supra note 102.
In the case of U.S. export controls on encryption items (which are considered particularly
sensitive), the definition is somewhat broader, but still canalized sufficiently to avoid major
transnational disputes. This definition also includes foreign subsidiaries in which a U.S.
person owns a substantial minority stake or over which it exercises effective control via the
board of directors or a management contract. § 772.1 (defining “U.S. subsidiary”). This
definition is analogous, in a broad sense, to piercing the corporate veil: what matters is not the
form of ownership or control, but the substance. While this approach can be difficult in
application, in principle it is not inconsistent with international law principles of prescriptive
jurisdiction.
148. Abbott, supra note 112, at 86; Leigh, supra note 114, at 50–51; Lowenfeld, supra
note 9, at 362.
149. Abbott, supra note 112, at 85.
150. Leigh, supra note 114, at 51; Abbott, supra note 112, at 87, 89. In fact, several U.S.
exporters asked the relevant U.S. export authorities, before they exported the technology in
question, whether any export/reexport control restrictions would apply to these products.
They were informed that no such restrictions would apply. See Extraterritorial Application,
supra note 14, at 1308; see also Compagnie Européene des Pétroles S.A. V. Sensor Nederland
B.V., No. 82/716 (Dist. Ct. The Hague Sept. 17, 1982).
151. See INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 834, 851 (1982) (Britain); Rattner, supra
note 142 (discussing Britain’s response); Compressors Leave Le Havre for Soviet, supra note
142 (discussing France’s response).
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152

licensed for use for a lawful purpose. In other words, it imposed enduse restrictions, even when there was no reexport of the technology.
That meant this prohibition had broad impact on foreign licensees of the
153
U.S. technology in question.
3. The Foreign Response to the June 1982 Restrictions
The foreign reaction to this unprecedented assertion of U.S.
154
extraterritoriality was “sharp and hostile.” European states, joined by
Japan, publicly denounced the new restrictions and filed diplomatic
155
protests with the United States.
European governments encouraged
companies located within their borders to continue performance under
pipeline project-related contracts, and in certain cases these
governments actually issued formal orders mandating continued
performance, thus imposing on affected companies a stark Hobson’s
156
choice. The United States’ response was to “blacklist” companies that
defied these U.S. end-use restrictions by placing them on a “temporary
157
denial” list.
This meant that those companies were prohibited from
participating, in any manner, in any transactions (Soviet-related or
otherwise) involving U.S.-origin oil and natural gas products and
158
technology.
This blacklisting adversely affected those companies’
159
Yet despite the blacklisting, European
overall business activities.
companies involved in the trans-Siberian pipeline project continued to
perform on their pipeline contracts, both by manufacturing products
using the licensed U.S.-origin technology in question and by exporting
160
those products to the Soviet Union.

152. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 1. Marcuss and Mathias note that these
restrictions in the 1982 Trans-Pipeline controversy were “the first example of retroactivity of
[U.S.] foreign policy export controls in the foreign-product context.” Id. at 15.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 114–29; see also Amendment of Oil and Gas
Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (June 22, 1982). In an important sense, then,
these end-use-focused licensing restrictions presaged the EPCI end-use/end-user controls
explicitly added to U.S. export regulations in the 1990s. See supra text accompanying notes
71–82.
154. Abbott, supra note 112, at 88.
155. Id.
156. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 71.
157. Abbott, supra note 112, at 89.
158. Id.; Leigh, supra note 114, at 51–52 (summarizing in detail the terms of these
temporary denial orders).
159. Abbott, supra note 112, at 89.
160. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 72.
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High-profile challenges also ensued in U.S. federal courts, where the
denials of export (and reexport) privileges were challenged as violations
161
of due process.
Administrative petitions were filed by affected
162
companies with the Department of Commerce, and legislation was
introduced in Congress to require rescission of the December 1981
163
phase and June 1982 phase export control restrictions.
These
legislative efforts were far from mere exercises in rhetoric and political
grandstanding: one of the bills was defeated in the House of
164
Representatives by a mere three-vote margin (206 to 203).
Most important of all, perhaps, was the fact that the trans-Siberian
pipeline controversy caused a rapid deterioration of relations between
165
the United States and its European trading partners. Instead of being
a narrow—albeit important—dispute over the trans-Siberian pipeline
project, the controversy began to affect the United States’ overall
economic and defense-related relations with major trading partners.
4. The United States Backs Down
Because of the adverse foreign reaction, by late 1982 the U.S.
government was “looking for a graceful way out” of the pipeline
166
controversy.
In November 1982, President Reagan announced that
because the U.S. and its Western European allies had reached an
agreement on a cooperative policy approach toward the Soviet Union,
the United States would lift the December 1981 and June 1982
167
restrictions on the trans-Siberian pipeline project.
Accordingly, the
U.S. export control restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union of oil and
natural gas transmission and refining equipment were lifted; the
suspension on processing export licenses for the Soviet Union was also
lifted; and the Department of Commerce announced that henceforth
such license applications would be reviewed under a general policy of
168
approval, subject to certain exceptions. The United States also lifted
the temporary denial orders issued against European companies that

364.

161. Id. at 72–73. Another case was litigated in Europe, see Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Abbott, supra note 112, at 88.
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 364.
Id.; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 83–84.
Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 84 nn.541–42.
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had continued to supply goods and technology for the pipeline project
after the retroactive and extraterritorial June 1982 phase restrictions
169
were put in place.
Despite the United States’ announcement, it is not entirely clear
170
what the terms of this agreement were.
The United States claimed
that its European trading partners had agreed to jointly conduct, with
the United States, an “urgent study” of western dependence on Soviet
oil and natural gas and of possible alternative energy sources, and that
pending the study’s completion these nations would harmonize and
further tighten their controls on exports of certain strategic items to the
Soviet Union, as well as forgo signing new contracts for Soviet natural
171
gas.
European states, however, claimed that the agreement was
limited only to conducting the study, with no commitments to
172
coordinate export control provisions.
France’s President Mitterrand
went so far as to state publicly that “la France is not a party to what is
173
perhaps not even an agreement.”
Regardless of what was or was not agreed to, what is clear (aside
from Mitterrand’s panache) is that the lifting of these export control
restrictions “was an awkward withdrawal” by the United States “from a
174
misconceived and divisive policy.”
The United States was trying to
save face. Whether it succeeded in doing so is less relevant than the fact
that, in the face of strong European opposition to the June 1982 phase
restrictions, the United States rescinded those restrictions and the denial
orders relating to them.
F. The Pipeline Dispute’s Legacy: Exponentially Expansive Jurisdiction
When the export control restrictions imposed by the United States in
the trans-Siberian pipeline controversy are boiled down to their essence,
it becomes apparent that European (and Japanese) concerns centered
largely on the retroactive, ex post restrictions the United States imposed

169. Id. at 84–85; Abbott, supra note 112, at 90; Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 364.
170. Leigh, supra note 114, at 52.
171. Moyer & Mabry supra note 14, at 85; Leigh, supra note 114, at 52–53.
172. See Leigh, supra note 114, at 52 (detailing the lack of information concerning the
terms of any agreement, France’s refutation of any such agreement, and subsequent U.S.
admissions consistent with France’s position); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 85
(reporting European denials of the agreement’s scope).
173. Leigh, supra note 114, at 52.
174. Id. at 53.

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

640

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

[97:3

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
175

on the use abroad of technologies already lawfully exported. It is also
clear that these U.S. assertions of jurisdiction were based on the U.S.
origin of the technologies involved. To paraphrase the words of two
observers in 1982, the U.S. position was that the United States could
restrict or control the technologies’ use at all times after they left the
United States, solely due to their U.S. origin—that is, that “U.S. law
176
[jurisdiction] runs with the [technologies].”
What is centrally important to understand is that while the United
States backed down in the Soviet pipeline controversy—Congress even
177
amended the EAA of 1979 to address the retroactivity issue —this
does not mean the United States ceased asserting item origin-based
178
jurisdiction in its export controls. Far from it. Since 1982, item originbased jurisdiction has become a central feature of post-Cold War U.S.
179
export controls. Thus, instead of controls based on direct exports or
express ex ante restrictions placed on specific reexports, or the
regulation of U.S. persons (including U.S. business operations) abroad,
the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls now rests squarely on the
origin of exported and reexported items—regardless of where such
items are located, or who is involved, or even how long such items have
180
been abroad.
This means that while retroactivity (a central feature of the pipeline
dispute) has become less central, the underlying jurisdictional problem
remains. The United States might choose, as a matter of comity or
commercial prudence, not to undertake an enforcement action regarding

175. The “U.S. person-based restrictions” on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies was
also a source of significant friction and dispute, but the definitional boundaries of such claims
of nationality jurisdiction were later resolved and are thus not focused on here. See supra
note 147 and text accompanying notes 120–24.
176. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 54 (“Here the claim seems to be that
because the goods or technology are of US origin, US law can continue to govern their
disposal to others, even after they have left the United States, or passed through the hands of
more than one buyer: i.e., that US law runs with the goods.”).
177. See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat.
120 (1985); Abbott, supra note 14, at 146.
178. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 147.
179. See infra notes 183–85 (discussing the United States’ percentage-based approach to
determining and asserting jurisdiction over foreign-made items containing U.S. content).
180. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining
“Export” as “an actual shipment or transmission of items out of the United States,” and
“Reexport” as “an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one
foreign country to another foreign country”).
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a particular foreign activity involving U.S.-origin items —but that is a
very different thing than acknowledging a lack of jurisdiction, then later
changing one’s mind. This means that U.S. trading partners might, at
any time, find that transactions previously subject to a U.S. policy of
benign neglect (i.e., “the United States has jurisdiction, but we are not
going to pursue enforcement actions over your activities because we are
not concerned about them”) are now being paid attention to (i.e., “the
United States has jurisdiction, and we are going to use it”)—because all
along, prescriptive jurisdiction was asserted. This is, in a very important
sense, what President Reagan did in 1982: he backed off regarding the
prohibition of activities, but he did not back off regarding the assertion
of jurisdiction over those foreign activities in support of the pipeline
project.
The broad scope of this jurisdictional reach is now further expanded
by how the United States determines what items are covered. In
addition to U.S.-origin items, the United States also currently uses its
item origin-based approach to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over
foreign-origin items that contain certain levels of U.S. content (for
example, components or sub-systems), as well as over “foreign-made
182
commodities that are ‘bundled’ with controlled U.S.-origin software.”
That is, U.S. content can taint foreign-origin items, so as to bring those
foreign-origin items within the jurisdictional scope of U.S. export
183
controls. The standard U.S. content threshold is 25% by value, but for
184
certain problematic destinations the threshold is only 10% —and for a
few problematic items, the threshold is any percentage greater than
185
zero. To say that this is an expansive application of item origin-based
jurisdiction is a supreme understatement: not only is it conceptually
186
aggressive, but it also poses practical challenges because it can be
181. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 147 (noting that “[t]he Reagan Administration’s
approach has been to moderate the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, out of comity or
concern for U.S. commercial interests . . . without yielding any of its jurisdictional claims”).
182. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(a)(3) (2013).
183. Id. § 734.4(d).
184. Id. § 734.4(c).
185. Id. § 734.3 (defining “[i]tems subject to the EAR”); id. § 734.4(a) (“Items for which
there is no de minimis [U.S. content].”). For a discussion of the historical origins of these de
minimis rules, see Abbott, supra note 14, at 144–46.
186. See Peter L. Flanagan & Eric D. Brown, Foreign Trade Controls, in E-COMMERCE
LAW & BUSINESS 12–39 (Mark E. Plotkin et al. eds., 2003) (noting, with respect to foreignorigin software, that “[a]s a practical matter, these controls potentially are applicable to many
export transactions originating outside the United States because of the leading market
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difficult to determine what a foreign-origin item’s U.S. content
187
percentage is—especially when an item is software or technology.
Origin determinations, and thus jurisdiction, end up hinging on
188
accounting methodologies. And because U.S. export controls regulate
not just trans-border shipments (based on item classification and
ultimate destination), but also end-uses and in-country transfers to other
parties (i.e., end-users), the counterintuitive result is that U.S. export
(and reexport) controls over U.S.-origin and non-de minimis U.S.content items apply to transactions and activities overseas that do not
189
involve exports or reexports at all.
The jurisdictional expansiveness does not end there. The United
States also asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over some wholly nonU.S. origin items that are the “direct products” of certain U.S.-origin
technologies subject to “national security” controls under the EAR
190
(that is, certain sensitive technologies) —controls that mirror the June
191
1982 restrictions discussed above. Defenders of this sort of jurisdiction
might argue that such jurisdiction only covers a narrow swath of
192
products controlled for “national security” reasons under the EAR,
but being narrow is not the same thing as being permissible in all cases.
It certainly was not sufficient to avoid a firestorm of controversy in 1982.
Moreover, the United States’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
does not appear to be premised on a foreign party’s knowledge or on
notice. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the EAA of
1979 and the EAR as establishing “strict liability” for violations, which
means that a violation occurs even when a foreign party does not know
193
or have reason to know that a particular item is controlled.
This
would seem to mean, by logical extension, that lack of knowledge that
position of many U.S. software applications”).
187. The rules for determining U.S. content of foreign-made software are set forth in a
supplement to Part 734 of the EAR. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734
Supp. No. 2(a)(3)(ii) (2013).
188. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text (discussing the percentage-based
system that the United States uses to exercise jurisdiction over an item).
189. It is, in fact, possible to violate U.S. export control laws without any export having
occurred. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.1–.4 (end-use and end-user controls).
190. Id. § 734.3(a)(4) (regarding “[c]ertain foreign-made direct products of U.S. origin
technology or software”); id. § 736.2(b)(3) (regarding export restrictions on such items).
191. See supra Part II.E.2.
192. 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3)(ii)(A)(2) (regarding “national security controls”
requirement for such items); § 742.4 (regarding EAR “national security” controls).
193. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257–59 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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an item is subject to U.S. export controls does not thwart U.S.
jurisdiction as a matter of U.S. law.
As the volume of exports has grown in recent years, and as more and
more multimodal sourcing occurs in foreign manufacturing, there has
been an exponential increase in the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export
194
controls. This current state of affairs is illustrated in Figure 3. It is a
useful (and sobering) exercise to compare Figure 3’s expansive scope to
the more limited (and conventional) scope of U.S. export control
prescriptive jurisdiction in Figure 2, above.
Figure 3

194. This can lead to inconsistent origin determinations within and among U.S.
international trade laws. For example, under U.S. customs law, U.S.-origin components that
are incorporated into complex equipment abroad can be considered to become foreign-origin,
even if that equipment is later disassembled. See U.S. Customs Serv. Ltr. Rul. HQ 559703
(Aug. 23, 1996), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov/detail.asp?ru=559703&ac=pr (ruling that
aircraft engine parts produced in various countries but assembled into aircraft engines in
another country were substantially transformed during engine manufacture and became
products of the country of engine assembly, and retained that origin even when the engines
were later disassembled for maintenance and repair). The same result, of course, is not true
under U.S. export controls.
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The combined effect of these jurisdictional assertions is
extraordinary enough to warrant repeating: the United States claims the
right to tell (a) wholly non-U.S. parties, (b) who are located outside the
United States and who possess lawfully obtained U.S. origin items,
lawfully produced foreign-origin items with non-de minimis U.S.
content, or certain wholly non-U.S. origin items, (c) not only where and
to whom they may provide these items, but also (d) what may not be
done with these items in-country, and (e) to do so in perpetuity. The
United States may have conceded defeat in the 1982 battle over the
trans-Siberian pipeline controversy, but it did not back down from a key
195
jurisdictional assertion that was at the very heart of that controversy.
Since then, that key jurisdictional assertion has become a cornerstone of
modern U.S. export controls. What is more, the United States has
recast the restrictions imposed in 1982, which were quite obviously
retroactive, into a system of jurisdiction that is not based on
retroactivity, but rather on item origin and concerns over item end-uses
and end-users.
The reason for this broad jurisdictional reach is clear: the United
States wants to prevent unwanted transactions and activities, no matter
where they occur. With the passage of three decades since 1982,
however, is such expansive jurisdictional reach more justifiable now
than it was in the early 1980s? The next Part addresses that question
under the prescriptive jurisdictional principles of international law as set
forth in the Restatement (Third).
G. Consensual Multilateral Cooperation
Before addressing the application of the Restatement (Third),
however, it is important to address current multilateral export control
efforts and explain why they do not help address or resolve the
jurisdictional challenges of U.S. export controls. There are more
export-related international organizations and agreements in existence
today than in 1981 and 1982, but the effect of these efforts on
196
jurisdictional reach is indirect.
COCOM was disbanded in 1994 and

195. See supra Part II.E.2; supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 197–203 and accompanying text (discussing the Wassenaar
Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Group, and the Missile Technology Control
Regime); Part II.E.4 (concluding that jurisdictional authority did not change as a result of the
trans-Siberian pipeline episode).
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197

replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The Wassenaar
Arrangement’s forty-one participants work to coordinate their export
classification schemes and provide notice to one another regarding the
198
export of certain sensitive items, but the regime is weaker than its
predecessor, because participating countries cannot veto other
199
countries’ exports of sensitive items as they could under COCOM.
The Wassenaar Arrangement is, therefore, a less restrictive and more
consensus-based organization than COCOM.
Other multilateral export control-related organizations and
agreements are even more voluntary and consensual, and they also are
more narrowly limited to specific types of export activities. The result is
that unilateral jurisdictional rules are not curtailed. The Chemical
Weapons Convention is limited to chemical weapons matters, including
200
regulation of exports. The Australia Group Chemical and Biological
Weapons Nonproliferation Control Regime (Australia Group) is an
“informal forum of countries” that “seeks to ensure that exports do not
201
contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons.”
The Nuclear Suppliers Group is an informal group of countries that
seeks to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through consensual
202
guidelines concerning nuclear item exports and reexports. The Missile
Technology Control Regime is an “informal and voluntary association
of countries [dedicated to] non-proliferation of unmanned delivery
203
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.”
These are all worthy organizations or agreements, and the United
States participates in each, but the point for current purposes is that
while they address exports from common perspectives—concerns about
proliferation and missile technology—as currently structured they do
197. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 345–47; The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp.
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., Genesis of the Wassenaar
Arrangement, WASSENAAR.ORG, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/origins.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2014).
198. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Techs., supra note 90.
199. See Corr, supra note 89, at 450–58.
200. See Urs A. Cipolat, The New Chemical Weapons Convention and Export Controls:
Towards Greater Multilateralism?, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 393, 413–14 (2000).
201. AUSTRALIAGROUP.NET, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2014).
202. See NUCLEARSUPPLIERSGROUP.ORG, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/
default.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
203. Missile Technology Control Regime, supra note 11.
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not address, much less restrict, extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Thus,
while these efforts do help reduce frictions in the areas they address,
which likely reduces the risk of high-profile jurisdictional disputes in
those areas, many activities over which the United States claims export
jurisdiction still fall outside the scope of these organizations and
agreements. In fact, the 1982 trans-Siberian pipeline dispute concerned
none of the areas covered by Chemical Weapons Convention, Australia
Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, or Missile Technology Control
Regime. These cooperative efforts therefore do not eliminate the
problem presented by U.S. extraterritorial export control jurisdiction.
III. ANALYSIS OF U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPORT CONTROLS
UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES
The prescriptive jurisdiction provisions of the Restatement (Third)
were revised significantly from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States: by the 1980s, changing global trade
and international relations patterns clearly required a more nuanced
treatment of prescriptive jurisdiction than the Restatement (Second)’s
205
principles of territoriality and nationality allowed.
The Restatement
(Third)’s prescriptive jurisdictional principles therefore are
characterized by deliberate and significant overlaps among the various
206
bases for prescriptive jurisdiction,
and also by overarching
considerations of “reasonableness and fairness” that are intended to
207
An interesting
limit overly expansive assertions of jurisdiction.
temporal parallel therefore exists between the Restatement (Third)’s
move from territorial and nationality jurisdiction and the growing
extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls.
This is not a coincidence—updates to restatements are intended to
reflect changes in the law—but what is particularly interesting to
consider is whether the full scope of U.S. item origin-based export
204. See supra Part II.E.2 and accompanying text (noting that President Reagan, while
ultimately backing down during the pipeline dispute, did not disclaim the authority behind
the actions he took).
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note. The
Restatement (Second)’s provisions regarding territorial and nationality jurisdiction are set
forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 17–20, 30 (1965).
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. b.
207. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
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control jurisdiction can fit, doctrinally speaking, into the Restatement
(Third)’s expanded and reworked jurisdictional principles. Originally,
the scholarly consensus was “No”—and despite changes in international
208
trade over the past thirty years, this answer probably has not changed.
While it is possible now to justify more of the jurisdictional reach of U.S.
export controls than it was in 1982, it is still not possible to justify all of
it. Moreover, as the following discussion reveals in stark clarity, even
when the reach of item origin-based extraterritoriality is justifiable
under international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, the item
origin-based approach is unsatisfyingly, and indeed almost hopelessly,
awkward.
A. References (and Omissions) in the Restatement (Third) Concerning
Extraterritoriality and Export Controls
The Restatement (Third) does address the modern U.S. penchant for
extraterritoriality, but it does not specifically address item origin-based
209
jurisdiction.
Instead, the focus is on nationality jurisdiction over
210
foreign subsidiaries.
The Introductory Note to Part IV of the
Restatement (Third) states as follows:
Attempts by some states—notably the United States—to apply
their law on the basis of very broad conceptions of territoriality
or nationality bred resentment and brought forth conflicting
assertions of the rules of international law. Relations with
Canada, and also with several states in Western Europe, have at
times been strained by efforts of the United States to implement
economic sanctions—against China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other states—through restraints on foreign subsidiaries of
211
corporations based in the United States.
This Introductory Note continues by observing that “[p]artly in
response to the reactions of other states, the United States has modified
212
However—and of
its assertions of jurisdiction in some areas.”
particular relevance here—a review of the relevant provisions and
commentaries of the Restatement (Third) (including the one quoted
above), as well as of U.S. case law, clearly shows that U.S. self-restraint
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra note 14.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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concerning prescriptive jurisdiction has been in three areas—namely, (a)
control over foreign subsidiaries in trade sanction matters (that is,
addressing the question of how broad the definition of “U.S. Person”
213
can be for nationality jurisdiction purposes); (b) the extraterritorial
214
215
reach of antitrust law; and (c) criminal law matters —and that of
these, restraint has been greatest concerning U.S. control over foreign
216
subsidiaries.
213. Id. § 402.
214. Id. § 402 cmt. d. This Comment states as follows:
Controversy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the United States and
others, particularly through competition laws, on the basis of economic effect in
their territory, when the conduct was lawful where carried out. This Restatement
takes the position that a state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state,
when the effect or intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable under § 403.
Id.; see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); United
Phosphorous Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 961 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Nippon Paper Indust. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). In fact, two areas of U.S. law that are
consistently cited as examples of extreme U.S. extraterritoriality are antitrust law and export
controls. See, e.g., Small, supra note 45, at 284 (“Conflict over [U.S.] extraterritorial
jurisdiction has occurred in a variety of areas in recent years: antitrust, export controls, and
law enforcement.”). For a discussion of the antitrust case law origins of the Restatement
(Third)’s prescriptive jurisdictional principles, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International
Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393, 427–33 (1994).
215. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 842–43 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(refraining from applying U.S. law where defendant was not an American national); United
States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 195–96, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that
international law limited extraterritorial reach of jurisdiction because the United States did
not have exclusive or concurrent extraterritorial jurisdiction over its embassy).
216. The restrictions on jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries is quite clearly stated in
most U.S. trade sanction programs, such as the Iranian Transactions Regulations and
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. See Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 560.314 (2013) (excluding foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. companies from
the definition of “U.S. Persons” subject to the regulations); Sudanese Sanctions Regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 538.315 (2013) (same). By contrast, U.S. federal courts often (but certainly not
always) apply U.S. criminal and antitrust laws extraterritorially. See, e.g., United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (applying criminal conspiracy statute to U.S. and British
citizens on U.S. ship on the high seas, on the basis that there are “criminal statutes which are,
as a class, not logically dependent on . . . locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are
enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself”); Minn-Chem, Inc., v.
Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying U.S. antitrust law to international
potash price fixing); United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying a
U.S. racketeering statute to a murder in Mexico in furtherance of organized criminal activity,
despite all parties being Mexican citizens); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,
1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying U.S. conviction statute extraterritorially to foreign citizens
attempting to bring illegal aliens into the United States); Nippon Paper Indust. Co., 109 F.3d
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In addition, while Reporters’ Note 3 to section 431 of the
Restatement (Third) does mention item origin-based jurisdiction in the
context of enforcement jurisdiction, it does not delve into the distinction
between control of exports and control of reexports and end-use
217
abroad.
That note simply describes the nature of a principal tool of
U.S. export control enforcement—namely, the denial of export
privileges for parties found to have violated U.S. export control
218
provisions.
In other words, whether by design or omission, the Restatement
(Third) accurately reflects the fact that, as a matter of U.S. law, the
United States has not backed down from its assertion of broad, item
origin-based, prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. export
219
control laws.
The next question is the extent to which item originat 4, 6 (applying Sherman Act to “wholly foreign” criminal antitrust actions with “intended
and substantial” U.S. effects); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 921–22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying antitrust laws to IATA’s efforts to target airline
with predatory pricing).
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 431 rep. note 3 (“The Department of
Commerce has developed an elaborate system of classification of strategic commodities and
of countries eligible for exports of these commodities when they are of United States
origin.”).
218. Id. For discussion of these enforcement measures, see supra text accompanying
notes 157–60.
219. It is somewhat puzzling to consider that the question of jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries in U.S. trade control law has received more attention than the question of item
nationality, and that tensions concerning U.S. jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries have even
achieved a measure of resolution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1,
subch. A, intro. note. This does not seem to be because item origin-based jurisdiction is not
an important issue. The lack of consensus concerning item origin-based jurisdiction would
seem to be important enough to acknowledge in the commentaries or reporters' notes to the
Restatement (Third)—although this clarity could be (at least in part) a matter of hindsight.
Still, the onset of U.S. claims of item origin-based jurisdiction occurred early enough (1982) to
allow discussion of this claim in the Restatement (Third). Perhaps the silence was intentional.
Perhaps it was because scholars and policymakers (and thus the Restatement (Third)) often
treat trade sanctions (which rely on person-based nationality) and export controls (which rely
on item origin-based nationality) as two sides of the same coin—a view that tends to mask
some important, fundamental distinctions between the two types of programs. See, e.g.,
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361–68 (discussing the trans-Pipeline export control dispute and
the Cuban embargo); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14; see also supra notes 29–30 (discussing
this distinction). Perhaps this is because item origin-based assertions of extraterritoriality are
less intuitively obvious than person-based claims, despite the fact that item origin-based
claims are ongoing. Perhaps the matter simply was not considered worthy of being singled
out for attention. Or perhaps more than one (or even all) of these factors was in play.
Abbott surmised, in 1987, that “[t]he lack of a fuller or more definite treatment [of reexport
controls in the Restatement (Third)] is disappointing, but it probably indicates that the law on
the subject is too unsettled for restatement . . . .” Abbott, supra note 14, at 138.
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based extraterritorial jurisdiction can be justified under the Restatement
(Third)’s prescriptive jurisdictional principles. As noted above and
explained below, the twofold answer is “Not entirely” and
“Unsatisfactorily.”
B. Analysis Under the Restatement (Third) and Previous Scholarship
The Restatement (Third) lists several well-accepted bases of
jurisdiction, namely traditional (subjective) territorial jurisdiction,
nationality jurisdiction, objective territorial jurisdiction (including to an
extent the effects doctrine), protective jurisdiction, passive personality
220
jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction.
All but universal jurisdiction
(which itself is quite limited in scope) are limited by a requirement of
reasonableness, which is set forth in section 403 of the Restatement
221
(Third).
Because the asserted scope of U.S. export control jurisdiction is so
broadly extraterritorial, the reasonableness considerations embodied in
section 403 of the Restatement (Third) are of central importance.
Section 403 is therefore discussed first below. The various jurisdictional
bases set forth in sections 402 and 404 are then discussed, with particular
emphasis on whether, and to what extent, any of these bases might now,
three decades after the 1982 Soviet pipeline controversy, justify the
extreme extraterritorial reach of U.S. export controls. This Article
contends that these jurisdictional bases, when considered collectively,
are sufficient to justify much, but not all, of the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. controls, but that they do so extremely awkwardly. The strategic
(un)desirability of continuing to employ an item origin-based approach
to extraterritorial jurisdiction is then addressed in Part IV.
1. Reasonableness
Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) provides that even when one
or more of the prescriptive jurisdictional bases of section 402 are present
(that is, any jurisdictional basis other than universal jurisdiction), “a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a

220. The Restatement (Third) has as a predecessor, the 1935 Harvard Research, which
spelled out these bases in the criminal law context. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435 (Supp. 1935)
[hereinafter Harvard Research on International Law].
221. The reasonableness limitation evolved from U.S. antitrust case law. See Marcuss &
Mathias, supra note 14, at 17–20.
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person or activity having connections with another state when the
222
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”
Section 403 further
provides that determinations of reasonableness are to be made on a
223
case-by-case basis “by evaluating all relevant factors.”
When two states might reasonably exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
over the same activity (an outcome that sections 402 and 403 recognize
224
as likely), and it is not possible for the party in question to comply with
both states’ laws or regulations, section 403 establishes an obligation for
each state to evaluate its interests in comparison to the interests of the
other state in question, and to defer if the interests of the other state are
225
greater.
This balancing analysis does not need to be undertaken,
however, when the party in question can comply with both states’
226
assertions of jurisdiction.
Other relevant considerations of
reasonableness include whether the jurisdiction asserted is civil or
criminal (with criminal jurisdiction held to a much higher standard for
227
reasonableness) and the governmental level at which the jurisdictional
228
assertion is made.
A congressional or presidential determination, for example, might
be accorded greater weight than one by an agency pursuant to broad
229
statutory mandate.
The latter consideration may cut somewhat in
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(1), cmt. a.
223. Id. § 403(2). Such factors include, but are not limited to, the following: the extent to
which the activity to be regulated takes place in the state’s territory or has “substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory”; “the character of the activity to be regulated”
and its importance to the regulating state; “the extent to which other states regulate such
activities” and “the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted”;
the regulation’s “importance . . . to the international political, legal, or economic system”;
consistency of the regulation with “traditions of the international system”; whether, and to
what extent, other states “may have an interest in regulating the activity”; and “the likelihood
of conflict with regulation by another state.” Id.
224. See, e.g., id. § 403 cmt. d.
225. Id. § 403(3) & cmt. e.
226. Id. This language in section 403 is written in the context of two states but would
apply to conflicts among three or more states as well.
227. Id. § 403(3) cmt. f. & rep. note 8.
228. See id. § 403(2) & cmt. c.
229. See id. § 403(2). The presumptive reason for this latter consideration is that agency
decisions are not as fully representative as those made by elected officials—although as a
matter of U.S. law this closer reasonableness scrutiny seems to be in some tension with
general principles of deference to agency decisions, such as under the Chevron doctrine. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Alex O.
Canizares, Is Charming Betsy Losing Her Charm? Interpreting U.S. Statutes Consistently with
International Trade Agreements and the Chevron Doctrine, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 591,

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

652

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

[97:3

favor of U.S. export control extraterritoriality: the original measures in
the trans-Siberian pipeline dispute were imposed by President Reagan,
and they have continued as part of agency regulations through
230
subsequent administrations.
Section 403 thus provides a useful framework for analysis that
recognizes the ambiguous nature of modern extraterritorial jurisdiction
and allows for changes in the jurisdictional calculus over time. What
was not considered reasonable in 1982 might be considered reasonable
three decades later. The application of these reasonableness factors is
considered below in the discussion of each jurisdictional basis.
2. Subjective (Traditional) Territorial Jurisdiction
Subjective territorial jurisdiction, the power of a state to prescribe
laws for its territories, has been aptly described as the “least231
problematic source of prescriptive rules.”
The Restatement (Third)
provides that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
232
territory.”
Subjective territorial jurisdiction is presumptively
233
considered reasonable.
However, subjective territorial jurisdiction is quite clearly
insufficient to justify the full jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls
234
(see Figure 3).
While it certainly can be used to justify jurisdiction
over an export transaction that originates from the United States, or
jurisdiction over activities in the United States that are in support of
reexports from abroad (e.g., management support, supplying advice,
financing, or the like), much of the reexport activity over which the
United States claims prescriptive jurisdiction would not be covered by
this basis of prescriptive jurisdiction. It is probably true, as noted by
former U.S. Deputy Chief Counsel for Export Administration Cecil
235
Hunt, that “[t]he jurisdictional core of [U.S.] export controls is in a

593–95 (2006) (attempting to reconcile the Charming Betsy decision with the Chevron
doctrine, examining how courts have treated the two).
230. See supra Part II.E.2; supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
231. Koplow, supra note 42, at 37.
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(a).
233. See id. § 403(2)(a).
234. See Figure 3, supra.
235. Cecil Hunt, WILTSHIREGRANNIS.COM, http://www.wiltshiregrannis.com/sitecontent
.cfm?pageid=9&itemid=11086 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
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236

sense territorial,” but core jurisdictional coverage is, by definition, not
full jurisdictional coverage. The most contentious aspects of U.S. export
control jurisdiction fall far outside this jurisdictional basis.
3. Nationality Jurisdiction
a. Over Persons
Much of the scholarly discussion of U.S. export control
237
extraterritoriality has been focused on nationality jurisdiction. Under
the Restatement (Third), prescriptive jurisdiction may be exercised over
“the activities, interests, status, or relations of [a state’s] nationals
238
outside as well as within its territory.”
As a general proposition, a state’s exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction over its nationals abroad, both natural persons and juridical
239
ones, is not controversial. Controversies have arisen when the United
States has broadly defined the term “nationals” for trade sanction
purposes to include not just majority-owned foreign subsidiaries, but
also other foreign entities controlled in other ways, such as through
ownership of a large minority share of a company, placement of
members on a foreign company’s board of directors, management
240
contracts, and so on.
Such assertions of jurisdiction have led to
conflicts with the regulatory regimes of other states and have raised
241
Yet for the most part, the United
concerns about reasonableness.
242
States has scaled back such assertions of broad nationality jurisdiction,
and the remaining U.S. trade sanction program based on this expansive
application of nationality jurisdiction, the Cuban sanctions program, is
243
best characterized as being in its twilight years.
236. Hunt, supra note 14, at 23.
237. See Koplow, supra note 42, at 37–38; Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 18.
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(2).
239. See Koplow, supra note 42, at 37.
240. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 18.
241. See Small, supra note 45, at 284–86 (explaining conflicts); David B. Massey, Note,
How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419, 428 (1997) (referencing
international protests that the exercise of jurisdiction was “exorbitant,” leading to a
reasonableness requirement) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403 rep. note
1).
242. See supra note 147.
243. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Actions Needed for Lifting the U.S. Trade Embargo
Against Cuba, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 53, 80 (1995) (noting that conditions required for the
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More to the point here is the fact that jurisdiction based on the
nationality of natural and juridical persons is, like subjective territorial
jurisdiction, simply not sufficient to justify the current expansive
jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls, and this has not changed
since 1982. In fact, the insufficiency of this jurisdictional basis is what
led to the assertion of item origin-based jurisdiction in the first place: it
was when prohibitions leveled against foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies did not quell undesired foreign activity that the United States
244
adopted the item origin-based jurisdictional scheme.
The next
question, therefore, is whether jurisdiction based on the nationality of
items—goods, software or technology—is now a sufficient and
reasonable basis for extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, when it was
considered not sufficient or reasonable when first asserted in the early
1980s.
b. Over Items
David Koplow, writing in 1990, aptly characterized the assertion of
245
item origin-based nationality jurisdiction as “controversial.”
Several
years before that, Stanley Marcuss and D. Stephen Mathias noted that
“the nationality principle has not traditionally been viewed as applying
246
to property.”
Another writer was less circumspect and bluntly
described as “preposterous” the U.S. assertion of permanent jurisdiction
over goods based on their nationality, “regardless of how many times
247
they change hands.”
Regardless of phrasing, item origin-based nationality jurisdiction
generally has been rejected by commentators as a basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction. While limited exceptions have been recognized for some
physical items—namely, marine vessels, aircraft, and spacecraft—the
Restatement (Third) notes that jurisdiction in those cases is more
248
appropriately viewed as a sui generis rule. Exceptions also have been
U.S. to enact the LIBERTAD Act program to lift the Cuban trade sanctions “have become
more numerous”).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 166–74.
245. Koplow, supra note 44, at 38.
246. Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 21 (citing L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 145 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)).
247. Predictability and Comity, supra note 14, at 1317–18.
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. h. This Comment to
Restatement (Third) section 402 actually characterizes jurisdiction for marine vessels, aircraft,
and spacecraft as an extension of territorial jurisdiction, but my point is that these vessels and
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made for jurisdiction over cultural property: a state might permissibly
and reasonably exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over property of
249
important cultural value, based on the property’s national origin.
However, that rule also seems best viewed as a sui generis rule that is
250
based on cultural heritage concerns.
In other words, in certain very limited situations we might be
comfortable with item origin-based nationality-based jurisdiction,
251
pursuant to which a state’s “law runs with the goods,” but these are
narrow exceptions, not a general rule. Vessels and other craft can be
viewed as extensions of territory in a way that ordinary, simple goods
cannot be—you cannot physically travel on a computer as you can on a
vessel or aircraft, and the heritage-based justifications for jurisdiction
over items of cultural value do not apply to ordinary (and often
fungible) items. Moreover, a strong basis for nationality jurisdiction is
252
the idea of allegiance to the state —something that requires sentience,
253
residence, and territoriality. Goods, software, and technology cannot
craft are “items,” as opposed to natural or artificial persons, so it is possible to consider
jurisdiction over them from a territorial perspective as well. Marcuss and Mathias
characterized them as such in 1984, before finalization of the Restatement (Third). See
Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 21.
249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. c (describing assertion of
jurisdiction based on an item’s origin); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 415 (6th ed. 2003) (“The recognition and enforcement by a municipal
court of foreign legislation protecting the cultural heritage of the state concerned raises
problems of jurisdiction but such legislation may be presumed to be in accordance with the
public policy of the forum.”); see also Daniel W. Eck & Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Property,
38 INT’L LAW. 469, 471 (2004) (explaining country of origin measures to protect cultural
property under the UNESCO Convention); Marilyn E. Phelan, Cultural Property: Who Owns
It and What Laws Protect It?, 74 TEX. B.J. 202, 203–04 (2011) (warning that countries where
cultural property originated can bring suit to recover such illegally exported items).
250. See Phelan, supra note 249, at 204–05 (acknowledging the common law
development of international conventions to protect countries’ respective cultural property);
see also Eck & Gerstenblith, supra note 249, at 469–70 (noting individual countries’ and
United Nations’ efforts to protect looted material from the National Museum in Baghdad).
251. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 54.
252. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1325 (citing Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932)) (noting that a U.S. national located abroad and called to
testify in a lawsuit was bound to obey this summons because he was “a citizen of the United
States. He continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue of the obligations of
citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him, and he was bound by its laws
made applicable to him in a foreign country.”); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J.
4, 23 (Apr. 6) (stating that as a matter of international law, “nationality is a legal bond having
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties”).
253. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1326. This observation is reinforced
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owe allegiance, they do not have residence, and (at least for the time
254
being) they are not self-aware.
Furthermore, nowhere else in U.S. international trade law is there a
255
rule that items maintain their nationality permanently. In fact, rules
256
Taxation cases, for
regarding origin generally run to the contrary.
example, have developed a “comes to rest” theory, under which a good
ceases to be subject to the exporting country’s prescriptive jurisdiction
once the good falls out of the stream of commerce abroad (such as by
257
reaching its ultimate destination).
Under U.S. customs law, the
nationality of a good is considered extinguished when it is “substantially
transformed” into another good of a “different name, character or
use”—such as by processing (e.g., iron processed into steel) or by
complex manufacture (e.g., incorporation of components into complex
258
machinery).
It is hard to justify as reasonable a broadly
by the fact that Comment c. to section 402 of the Restatement (Third) discusses item originbased jurisdiction in the context of territoriality. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10,
§ 402 cmt. c (noting that “in some circumstances there may be controversy as to
whether . . . the territorial principle can be satisfied without the physical presence of the
person or thing being subjected to jurisdiction”) (emphasis added).
254. It is interesting (and perhaps a bit unnerving) to consider how the emergence of
sentient machines might alter this calculus.
255. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. c.
256. Predictability and Comity, supra note 14, at 1317–18. It also has been rejected by at
least two foreign courts, one in Hong Kong in 1953, and one in Belgium in 1965. See
Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1324.
257. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 134–35.
258. This rule of U.S. customs law is known as the “substantial transformation” rule. See
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNITY
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: U.S. RULES OF ORIGIN 9 (2004); see also Michael P. Maxwell,
Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported Merchandise: Transforming the Substantial
Transformation Test, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 669 (1990); C. Edward Galfand,
Comment, Heeding the Call for a Predictable Rule of Origin, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 469,
472–73 (1989); World Trade Org., Technical Information on Rules of Origin, WTO.ORG,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014)
(describing the substantial transformation test for origin as “universally recognized”).
There is a movement to replace the substantial transformation rule with a “tariff-shift”
rule, pursuant to which an item’s origin changes if its classification for customs purposes
changes in certain ways. This is the rule being advanced by the World Customs Organization
as a new global standard, and it is used, in modified form, in the North American Free Trade
Agreement and other regional trade agreements. See North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–473 (2012); North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 32 ILM 289, 299–303; World Customs Org., Comparative Study
on Preferential Rules of Origin, WCOOMD.ORG, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/ins
trument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-rules-of-origin.aspx (last visited Feb. 6,
2014) (examples of tariff-shift rules); Article 401, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-
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extraterritorial rule based on permanent item nationality when the same
approach is rejected in other international trade-related areas of U.S.
law. It also must be noted that this was the case in 1982, when item
origin-based nationality came to the fore in U.S. export controls, and it
259
remains the case today.
It is perhaps possible to argue that the lack of strong objection to
U.S. item origin-based jurisdiction over the past several decades is a
form of acquiescence by U.S. trading partners that suggests acceptance,
and is thus an evolution of customary international law with respect to
260
extraterritoriality.
However, the United States’ item origin-based
jurisdictional approach has not been adopted by other countries in a
way that would suggest acceptance of this approach. Moreover, to the
extent that U.S. trading partners do not object when certain non-U.S.
nationals abroad are added to the U.S. “Denied Persons List” and thus
prohibited from dealing in items subject to U.S. export controls, this
lack of objection just as likely represents (and probably more likely
represents) a lack of objection to those specific parties being listed as it
does a lack of objection to the item origin-based jurisdiction being
asserted. Stated differently, the fact that U.S. trading partners do not
object to a particular party being barred from transactions involving
U.S.-origin and U.S.-content items is not the same thing as acquiescence
to a broad U.S. claim of jurisdiction over all parties (barred and
otherwise), wherever located, who deal in items subject to U.S. export
controls.

sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=SectionView&mid=1588&sid=feb541cc-bfc2-4240829f-b5a7ec26a08a&language=en-US (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (tariff-shift rules in the North
American Free Trade Agreement); see also United States–Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-42, § 201, 125 Stat. 462, 466–67 (2011)
(approved under 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2012)). The tariff-shift approach, however, is largely a
change in mechanism from a subjective approach to a more objective one: the underlying goal
of allowing origin changes for significant alterations or processing remains the same as under
the substantial transformation rule.
259. See Part II.E.2 (discussing the June 1982 export control restrictions).
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, §§ 101–02; Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see also Cleveland,
supra note 24, at 6–7 (citing Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal
International Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99,
100 (1995–1996)).
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4. Objective Territorial Jurisdiction (and the Effects Doctrine)
Under the objective territorial principle of jurisdiction, prescriptive
jurisdiction may be asserted over acts that occur outside the United
States but have adverse or detrimental “substantial effect within” the
261
United States.
This sort of territorial jurisdiction thus differs
profoundly from subjective (traditional) territorial jurisdiction, which
262
pertains to acts that occur within the territory of a state. In U.S. law
there is also the effects doctrine, which plays a large role in U.S.
263
antitrust law, securities regulation, and criminal law. There has been
significant discussion regarding the distinction between objective
264
territorial jurisdiction and the effects doctrine, but this Article eschews
that debate and includes the potentially broader view of the effects
doctrine within this discussion—not because of any latent superiority of
the effects doctrine, but rather because U.S. item origin-based export
control jurisdiction is problematic even under that potentially more
permissive approach.
Objective territorial jurisdiction is both generally accepted and
controversial, depending on the context of its application. It is generally

261. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(c) & cmt. d. The leading international case on objective
territorial jurisdiction, the Permanent Court of International Justice’s decision in the S.S.
Lotus case, stated it thusly (and perhaps more narrowly): “[O]ffences, the authors of which at
the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be
regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent
elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.” S. S.
“Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (Sept. 7).
262. Because of these large differences, it is sometimes viewed as an entirely separate
jurisdictional category. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. d.
263. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§ 22.15 (3d ed. 2001); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 2 SECURITIES LAW
HANDBOOK § 37:2.10 (2013); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
§ 2.9 (2d ed. 1986); see also Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1327.
264. See, e.g., Mika Hayashi, Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine?
Jurisdiction and Cyberspace, 6 IN. LAW 284, 288–90 (2006); J. Troy Lavers, Extraterritorial
Offenses and International Law: The Argument for the Use of Comity in Jurisdictional Claims,
14 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 6 n.30 (2007) (“The effects doctrine justifies jurisdiction of an
extraterritorial act based on the effects it produces within the state, which is distinct from the
objective territorial principle where jurisdiction is based on certain element(s) of the offense
being completed in the territory.”); Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S.
Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 511 (1998) (“Countless
law journal articles have dealt with the differences between the principle of objective
territorial jurisdiction described in the Lotus decision and the ‘effects doctrine’ announced in
the Alcoa [antitrust] decision.” (footnotes omitted)).
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accepted when the act outside the territory of a state involves a harmful
action that begins outside the state but ends with direct harm inside the
265
state —classic examples include a cross-border shooting and foreign
266
products placed into another state’s stream of commerce. Yet analysis
of jurisdictional claims under this principle can be an exercise in
267
navigating a slippery slope. The classic examples are clear, and at least
partial acceptance of the effects doctrine in the antitrust context (within
268
the realm of reasonableness) shows that consensus is possible, but
beyond those contexts the analysis quickly devolves into a normative
exercise based on subjective values. This can be particularly true in the
269
context of extraterritorial export control jurisdiction.
For example,
Marcuss and Richard suggested in 1982 that jurisdiction over reexport
activity under the effects doctrine might be warranted “in cases in which
the reexport was expected to permit a foreign state to create undesirable
270
effects within the territory of the United States.”
Their observation
was an aside that they did not further elaborate on, but it is easy to see
how one’s definition of “undesirable direct effects” (to combine their
language with the language of sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement
271
(Third)) might lead to expansive jurisdictional claims.
Are such
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. d.
266. See id. In this regard, there is parallelism with the outbound reach of jurisdiction
under U.S. tax law’s stream of commerce analysis of jurisdiction over items abroad. See supra
notes 255–57.
267. See Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1327–28.
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 rep. note 2 (“The effects [doctrine]
has been a major source of controversy when invoked to support regulation of activities
abroad by foreign nationals because of the economic impact of those activities in the
regulating state. This basis for jurisdiction is increasingly accepted for regulation of
restrictive business practices . . . .”).
269. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 145, 154 (1972–1973).
270. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 480 n.154. An interesting side note to this
claim is that, for reasons that do not entirely hold up to scrutiny, Marcuss and Richard drew a
distinction between items controlled under U.S. export controls for “foreign policy” reasons
and items controlled for “national security reasons.” Id. passim. This distinction is also made
by another article co-authored by Marcuss. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14 passim.
Yet as discussed in Part II.C.3.b. of this Article, this distinction is largely illusory: U.S.
regulators generally have discretion to classify an item as subject to stricter national security
controls or more permissive foreign policy controls as they see fit. See supra notes 109–11;
infra text accompanying notes 292–93.
271. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 480 n.154; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 10, § 402(3) (allowing for jurisdiction concerning “certain conduct outside its
territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state”); id.
§ 403(2)(a) (describing a factor of the reasonableness analysis as a consideration of the
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effects economic? Security-related? Foreign policy-related? How
direct do they need to be? How undesirable do they need to be? The
slope is slippery indeed.
The objective territorial principle or effects doctrine thus might be a
valid basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in some situations, but they
fall short as a complete justification for the extraterritorial scope of U.S.
export controls for at least two reasons. First, the jurisdictional scope of
U.S. export controls is based on item nationality, not on effect of the
272
transactions on the United States.
The fact that items are of U.S.
origin does not mean their further sale abroad will always have any
effect within or on the United States, economic or otherwise. If an item
is reexported from France to Germany for commercial use, this likely
will have no security impact on the United States, and at most an
indirect economic impact on the United States. This is even more true
for items that have been located abroad for several years or more. The
point is that while jurisdiction over some of these transactions might be
273
justified, jurisdiction over all of them cannot be.
As a blanket
authorization for export control extraterritoriality, the objective
territorial principle falls short.
Second, analogizing extraterritorial export control jurisdiction to
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction (where the effects doctrine comes
into direct play in U.S. law) is problematic because these two areas of
regulatory control differ significantly in their goals and effects. While
on one level both export controls and antitrust laws are intended to have
positive economic effects—a core goal of U.S. export control law is to
274
promote exports and prevent unwanted export activity, and a core goal
of antitrust law is to promote beneficial economic activity by preventing
275
anticompetitive practices —they differ in terms of the activities they
are intended to prohibit. The justification for antitrust laws is that
monopoly behavior can have an anticompetitive effect, and that a lack of
competition results in gains by the few (monopolists) at the greater
276
expense of the many (U.S. consumers).
In other words, there is an
“substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory”).
272. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(c) & cmt. d.
274. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (2006).
275. BRENT A. OLSON & LISA C. THOMPSON, BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK, ADVANCED
TOPICS IN BUSINESS LAW § 23:1 (2011–2012 ed. 2011).
276. LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS, & MONOPOLIES § 4:3 (4th ed. 2013).
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overall economic gain to be achieved by restricting anticompetitive
277
monopoly behavior. In contrast, restrictions on exports and reexports
do not have a direct economic benefit. To the contrary, they may have
an adverse economic impact on the United States by restricting some
transactions in order to promote noneconomic national security and
278
foreign policy goals of the United States —goals that do concern the
state, but do not always have direct and substantial effects on U.S.
279
territory. As the importance of international trade has grown over the
past several decades—resulting in increased U.S. export control
jurisdiction—this difference between antitrust law and export controls is
280
stronger than ever.
The result, therefore, is that objective territorial jurisdiction might
be used to justify U.S. jurisdiction over some transactions over which
the United States claims item origin-based jurisdiction, but, like the
other bases discussed so far, it cannot be used to justify the full reach of
jurisdiction asserted by the United States.
5. Passive Personality Jurisdiction
Under the passive personality principle, states may apply their law to
acts committed outside their territory by a nonnational when the victim
281
of the act is a national of the country seeking to assert jurisdiction. As
noted in the comments to section 402 of the Restatement (Third), this
principle is to be narrowly applied: its use has not been generally
accepted for prosecution of crimes or for actions in tort, but it has been
accepted as a jurisdictional basis for actions against terrorist attacks on a
282
state’s nationals or attacks on a state’s diplomatic personnel.

277. Id.
278. Lowenfeld has argued that this is a way to justify U.S. trade sanctions: they may
restrict economic activity, but unlike restrictive import actions (antidumping, countervailing
duty, and safeguard actions) trade sanctions also directly harm the United States
economically. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 355.
279. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 12; Extraterritorial Application, supra
note 14, at 1328. But see Lunine, supra note 14, at 668–69 (arguing that the effects doctrine is
sufficient basis for extraterritorial control over foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms).
280. Lowenfeld has suggested that this could be used as a basis for justifying U.S. trade
sanctions, which, unlike inbound trade protective measures (such as quotas and trade remedy
measures like antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard measures), do not protect or
support the implementing state’s economic activity. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 369.
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(c).
282. Id. § 402 cmt. g & rep. note 3.

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

662

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

[97:3

For purposes of the extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls, the
passive personality principle is of little help. The jurisdictional reach of
export controls is based on items, and extraterritorial jurisdiction over
non-U.S. nationals for certain serious harm caused to U.S. nationals
does not provide a solid jurisdictional base for such claims. Some acts
committed by non-U.S. nationals against U.S. nationals that involve
U.S. items might be covered by passive personality jurisdiction, but the
scope of covered activities is likely too limited to be of much use in the
export control context.
6. Protective Jurisdiction
Restatement (Third) section 402(3) states that, subject to the
requirement of reasonableness, prescriptive jurisdiction may be
permissible over “certain conduct outside [a state’s] territory by persons
not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or
283
against a limited class of other state interests.” Protective jurisdiction
is often asserted when non-U.S. nationals have committed an act outside
the United States that is “directed against the security of the state or
other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions that
are generally recognized as crimes”—acts such as espionage, conspiracy
284
to violate immigration or customs laws, and the like. The harm being
285
avoided must be more than a “potential generalized effect”; it must be
286
Protective jurisdiction thus is intended to
clear and demonstrable.
help shield a state from harm to “fundamental national interests”
287
through application of the state’s laws to activities abroad, and it has
288
its origins in a state’s right to self-defense and self-preservation.
Protective jurisdiction does have the potential to serve as a
justification for much of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export
controls, in a way that the other jurisdictional bases discussed above
283. Id. § 402(3); see also United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. JamesRobinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(3) & cmt. f.
285. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1330–31.
286. Id.
287. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 446–47; SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 118,
at 772. Swan and Murphy’s phraseology improves upon the original exposition of these
principles in Harvard Research on International Law, supra note 220.
288. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 247, § 144a. Protective jurisdiction can be viewed as a
“special application” of the effects doctrine, although it is generally categorized separately.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. f.
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cannot. The Cold War era did present the very real threat of destructive
large-scale warfare, but it also had a stability to it that the current era of
asymmetrical threats does not. Indeed, the peace and prosperity of the
Cold War era was built on the doctrine of “Mutually Assured
289
Destruction,” which held that balance was the key to peaceful
coexistence, but the two decades since the end of the Cold War have
290
been characterized by global instability. If threats are harder to spot,
and if broad jurisdictional scope is a widely cast net that is suited to
regulating “certain conduct outside [a state’s] territory by persons not its
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a
291
limited class of other state interests,” then at least some of the broad
scope of extraterritorial U.S. export controls might be justified.
Protective jurisdiction, however, presents the danger of overly
aggressive application.
Its use could infringe significantly upon
292
traditional “notions of territorial integrity” and sovereignty, and like
objective territorial jurisdiction it certainly presents a slippery slope of
application. Moreover, protective jurisdiction only justifies jurisdiction
over items abroad when national security-level interests are at stake. It
does not justify blanket item origin-based jurisdiction. And the fact that
other states do not assert a similarly extraterritorial reach in their export
controls suggests that liberal application of this factor would not satisfy
293
the reasonable requirements of Restatement (Third) section 403.
In addition, there is also the fact that protective jurisdiction is often
294
limited to conduct that civilized nations universally consider criminal.
289. Nuclear Age Peace Found., Mutual Assured Destruction, NUCLEARFILES.ORG,
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strate
gy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
290. See id.
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(3); see also United States v. VasquezVelasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
292. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1330–31 (“As suggested in the
preceding discussion of the objective territorial principle, recognition of extraterritorial
jurisdiction to protect national security interests raises fears that such a doctrine has the
potential to emasculate notions of territorial integrity. The breadth of contemporary
perceptions of threats to national security interests aggravates these apprehensions.”).
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(2)(c).
294. Id. § 404 & cmt. a; Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1330 n.131 (“It
would be abusive if a State invoked the protective principle without due regard to the
importance of the offense. In all cases, here as elsewhere, the standard is supplied solely by
international law, i.e., by the general practice of civilized states.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1973))).

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

664

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

[97:3

Not all activity that might be caught by U.S. export control jurisdiction
is criminal activity, and as most enforcement actions under U.S. export
295
controls are civil —in part because some of the activity may not be
criminal (just unwanted for export control reasons), and in part to avoid
the higher procedural and substantive due process implications of
296
criminal proceedings.
All in all, protective jurisdiction provides
broader jurisdictional reach for U.S. extraterritorial export controls than
the other bases discussed above, but it too is not broad enough to
297
encompass the whole.

295. See also supra Part II.D.
296. See Jordan Stapley, The Art of Export Control and Enforcement, 17 CURRENTS:
INT’L TRADE L.J. 46, 47–48 (2008).
297. There is an interesting side note to the application of protective jurisdiction to U.S.
export controls. Marcuss and Richard, writing in 1982, drew a sharp distinction between
items subject to “foreign policy” export/reexport controls under the EAR, and those subject
to more stringent “national security” export/reexport controls under the EAR. They
concluded that while protective jurisdiction could not be justified for items controlled under
the EAR for “foreign policy” reasons, it might be justified for items covered by the EAR’s
“national security” controls:
[N]ot every export, even to a long-time adversary, necessarily has any appreciable
effect on the security of the United States. . . .
. . . If national security controls are carried out in a cautious spirit respectful of
the sovereignty of others, they appear to have the potential to comply fully with
international legal considerations as articulated in the protective principle.
Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 479.
This statement is interesting for two reasons. First, while it is true that the EAA of 1979
does list “national security” and “foreign policy” as two separate reasons for control of
exports, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 2405 (1976), Marcuss and Richard placed inflated importance
on the distinction between these two bases for control under the EAA of 1979 and the EAR.
In practice, the two categories are largely interchangeable, despite their intended differences.
ROOT, LIEBMAN & THOMSEN, supra note 29, § 4.1.1. Kenneth Abbott noted in 1984 (just
two years after Marcuss and Richard) that eliminating extraterritoriality for foreign policycontrolled items but permitting extraterritoriality for national security-controlled items
simply would lead the president to classify more items as controlled for national security
purposes—much in the same way that Justice Jackson noted, in his concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, that in national security matters the founders may well
have “suspected that emergency [presidential] powers would tend to kindle emergencies.”
Abbott, supra note 112, at 108–09; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Thus, while the foreign policy/national security
distinction was fairly prominent in earlier scholarship, it is deemphasized in this Article’s
analysis because it is, in the end, a distinction without much difference.

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

665

7. Universal Jurisdiction
Pursuant to section 404 of the Restatement (Third), a state may
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over offenses considered to be of
“universal concern” to the community of nations, even if that state could
not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction under one of the other bases
298
discussed above. Thus, on the one hand, universal jurisdiction offers
extremely broad reach, and unlike the other bases of prescriptive
299
jurisdiction, it is not limited by a requirement of reasonableness. As
Eugene Kontorovich has stated, universal jurisdiction “is not premised
on notions of sovereignty [and thus on the basis of territoriality or
300
nationality] or state consent. Rather, it is intended to override them.”
On the other hand, its scope is quite narrow: it traditionally has been
limited to “actions such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
301
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”
While there is some disagreement as to whether universal
302
jurisdiction applies outside the criminal law context,
universal
303
jurisdiction has most commonly been sought in criminal law matters.
The recent Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, in fact,
focused exclusively on universal jurisdiction in the context of
304
prosecutions for certain “serious crimes.”
Even assuming that
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404 & cmt. a.
299. Id. § 404.
300. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184–86 (2004) (warning of universal jurisdiction’s
“dangerous consequences” in its potential to create conflict among sovereigns).
301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404.
302. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761–63 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(acknowledging the possibility of universal jurisdiction in civil actions); Curtis A. Bradley,
Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 347–48 (2001) (arguing
against universal jurisdiction in civil litigation, on the basis that plaintiffs and courts cannot
balance the foreign policy concerns present in human rights lawsuits); M. O. Chibundu,
Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry,
39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1133 (1999) (arguing against universal jurisdiction in civil cases). But
see K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1
(2004) (asserting that use of universal jurisdiction in certain civil contexts, in particular the
human rights context, is warranted and not inconsistent with separation of powers).
303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404; Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal
Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 175 (2006) (“[S]tates’ domestic laws
facilitating universal jurisdiction flow routinely from the criminalization of the conduct in
question at the level of international conventional law.”); James J. Friedberg, The Wane in
Spain (of Universal Jurisdiction): Spain’s Forgetful Democratic Transition and the Prosecution
of Tyrants, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 825, 866 (2012).
304. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo
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universal jurisdiction is proper in the noncriminal context, any civil
assertions of universal jurisdiction still would need to be over actions
305
qualifying as “universal concerns.”
The result is that any such
noncriminal proceedings likely would be tort or restitution cases that
306
were essentially in lieu of (or in addition to) criminal proceedings.
The focus on conduct traditionally viewed as criminal, or on civil
actions that are in lieu of criminal proceedings, narrows the export
control relevance of universal jurisdiction considerably. Some of what
the end-use controls of U.S. export controls might apply to—actions, for
example, in support of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
proliferation—might qualify as criminal activity under U.S. law, but not
all of it would be. Then there is also the fact that most export
enforcement actions taken by the United States are civil, even when
307
they might qualify for criminal treatment. In addition, even chemical
or biological weapons proliferation concerns do not, at the present time,
qualify as activities of “universal concern” that warrant universal
jurisdiction. In short, universal jurisdiction, as currently understood, is
not a viable basis for extraterritorial prescriptive export control
jurisdiction.
8. Consent
Consent to U.S. extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction by foreign
parties is not listed as a jurisdictional basis under the Restatement
(Third), but it has been advanced by several commentators as a
justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. export control
laws. Marcuss and Richard argued in favor of it in 1982, asserting that
parties in foreign countries that deal in items subject to U.S. export
controls are generally aware of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction claims,
due to the fact that documents for such transactions include “destination
control” language that notifies parties that those items are subject to

ed., 2001). The Princeton Principles list certain “Serious Crimes Under International Law” to
which universal jurisdiction could be applied, which include “(1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war
crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture.”
Id. at 29.
305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404 cmt. b.
306. See Boyd, supra note 303, at 3. For an overview of the general view of universal
jurisdiction and an alternative (and narrower perspective on universal jurisdiction), see
Kontorovich, supra note 300, at 183.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
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U.S. jurisdiction and export licensing requirements, and that by
proceeding with these transactions (instead of abandoning them), the
parties essentially are agreeing to be bound by and adhere to U.S.
309
export control laws.
Marcuss and Richard also pointed out that the
United States has the power to completely deny parties the power to
310
export—exportation is a privilege, not a right —and that as a matter of
logic, this greater power also must include the lesser power to restrict
311
exports and reexports.
This reasoning certainly has its appeal, but it does not work as well
in the modern, e-commerce world as it did in decades past. First, it is
not entirely clear how often the destination control language
requirements of U.S. export controls are adhered to. A transaction is
still subject to U.S. jurisdiction even when the parties do not receive
such notice—and per the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Iran Air v.
Kugelman, even good-faith violators of U.S. export control laws might
312
face civil penalties. Moreover, U.S. export controls apply not just to
goods, but to software and technology as well—and not just to
reexports, but also to in-country uses abroad that raise end-use
313
concerns. This raises the likelihood that the destination control notice
statements will not be given in electronic transactions or in-country
transactions, and that in turn increases the risk of inadvertent (and
good-faith) violations. While it may well be true that the United States
would be less likely to pursue an enforcement action against good-faith
violators, that is a very different thing than saying that the United States
does not have jurisdiction to do so.
A third problem is that publication of these reexport requirements
and jurisdictional claims in the Federal Register and Code of Federal
314
Regulations is at least somewhat questionable as a matter of public
308. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 476–77.
309. Id. at 478. For a discussion of consent as a justification for extraterritoriality in a
different context, see Bowman, supra note 16, at 224–42 (discussing consent as a justification
for extraterritorial reach of U.S. cargo security programs).
310. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (2013).
311. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 103 n.132; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at
439.
312. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also supra text
accompanying note 193.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 62–64.
314. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 734.5 (discussing some of the activities of the United States
and other nations that are controlled by the EAR); id. § 740.16 (discussing requirements for
certain permissive reexports).
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notice. It is one thing to consider domestic U.S. persons and companies
(and those that regularly do business with the U.S.) as being given
public notice in this manner—such parties can be considered to know, or
315
have reason to know, to be alert for such notices —but what about
parties that are far removed from the United States, or who may not
speak English, or who have not engaged in any previous transactions
over which the United States asserts jurisdiction? One can imagine the
outcry if a U.S. company were considered by the Spanish Government
to be subject to Spanish jurisdiction, based on a Spanish-language notice
published in a Spanish government publication. Moreover, pursuant to
the statutory authority for U.S. export control laws, advance notice of
316
changes to these rules is not required.
The latter point is more
relevant to concerns over retroactivity, which as explained above is not
317
really the gist of the concerns being addressed in this Article, but it
does further call into question the efficacy of the consent argument.
Perhaps an even more fundamental concern with consent as a basis
for jurisdiction, however, is that consent to not reexport (or transfer to
impermissible end-uses or end-users) is not necessarily the same thing as
318
consent to U.S. jurisdiction. Much in the same way that parties cannot
319
waive a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. federal court, the
consent of a party to U.S. extraterritorial export control jurisdiction may
320
be a derogation of the foreign state’s sovereignty.
The nature of
sovereignty is a complex and nuanced topic; suffice it to say here that, in
addition to the problems listed above, consent to jurisdiction may be
problematic from this perspective as well.
C. Concluding Thoughts Regarding the Restatement (Third)
Based on the discussion above of the Restatement (Third)’s bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction, four key themes emerge.

315. See The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations—A Reappraisal, 80
HARV. L. REV. 439, 443, 449 (1966).
316. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(f) (2000) (requiring
only notice of rule changes as they are implemented, not in advance).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53.
318. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1325–26.
319. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3522 (3d ed. 2008).
320. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1326.
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First, the doctrinal bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under
international law, as set forth in the Restatement (Third), continue to
work quite well in addressing areas of jurisdictional conflict and overlap.
The provisions of sections 402 through 404 of the Restatement
(Third) show admirable adaptability to an era characterized by far
greater international linkages than when they were drafted. The
drafters were correct to move away from strict territoriality and
nationality and toward principles that reflect the overlapping and
amorphous nature of jurisdictional assertions of lawmaking power.
Second, even with such flexible jurisdictional principles, it remains
difficult, and in fact probably not possible, to justify the full reach of
current U.S. extraterritorial export controls.
Some of the Restatement (Third)’s bases, such as subjective
territorial jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction, can be used to justify
much, but not all, of the reach of U.S. export controls. Of the
remainder, objective territoriality (and the effects doctrine), passive
personality, and especially protective jurisdiction may justify some of
the reach, and consent might justify even more, but gaps in coverage
remain. And looming above all of this is the specter of reasonableness
321
as a limiting factor.
Third, item origin-based extraterritorial jurisdiction raises the
potential for jurisdictional disputes between the United States and its
trading partners in a world where the potential for dispute, and the
322
ramifications of such disputes, are larger than they were in 1982.
Multilateral trade controls work far better in a world (such as
today’s world) that is characterized by multiple sources of supply for
goods, software, and technology—and effective multilateralism requires
agreement of some sort. Rather than running the risk of future disputes,
which might or might not be taken to the WTO for dispute settlement, it

321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403.
322. The showdown between the United States and European Union regarding the
Helms-Burton Act is a more recent example of the potential for high-stakes international
trade disputes between the United States and some of its major trading partners. WTO
dispute settlement proceedings in that dispute were only narrowly avoided. See Spanogle,
supra note 5, at 1313–15. That dispute was a trade sanctions dispute, not an export control
dispute, but it hinged on a quite aggressive assertion of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction over
foreign parties.
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would be preferable to identify a solution now, rather than continue
with a unilateral approach.
Fourth, even if one could successfully justify the full scope of the
jurisdictional reach asserted by the United States, the item origin-based
jurisdictional approach is, as the saying goes, “a hell of a way to run a
323
railroad.”
The item origin-based approach does not work well, or predictably,
or cleanly. When it does work, it does so by forcing the analysis to jump
awkwardly through an item origin hoop, rather than simply basing the
analysis on the actual underlying national security and foreign policy
324
concerns. The approach is cumbersome, misleading, and a vestige of a
bygone era. It would be preferable to scrap the approach in favor of
something based more directly on the underlying concerns.
IV. NEW CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The United States has not backed down in its assertion of the right
to assert item origin-based extraterritorial export control jurisdiction,
and instead appears to have relied on enforcement discretion to avoid
323. The origin of this saying (as with many popular catchphrases) is in some dispute.
One claimed reference, which characterizes the saying as referring to “organized chaos,” is a
1920 cartoon in Ballyhoo magazine that depicted a signalman commenting on an impending
collision of trains, instead of trying to do something about it. ERIC PARTRIDGE,
DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES: AMERICAN AND BRITISH FROM THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY 510 (Paul Beal ed., 2d ed. 1992). It has also been attributed
to a 1956 New Yorker cartoon in which a wealthy middle-aged man on a train holds up a
martini glass to two train conductors and complains, “This is a hell of a way to run a railroad!
You call that a dry martini?”
March 1, 2013, THIS DAY IN QUOTES,
http://www.thisdayinquotes.com/2010/03/back-to-old-drawing-board.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2014) (referring to THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1956, at 31). The latter seems a less likely
original source (although perhaps a funnier cartoon).
324. By way of analogy, university educators would have serious concerns if universities
decided to forgo examinations and instead base class grades, and thus student graduation,
solely on class attendance. Under this approach, students who attended class more regularly
would get higher grades than those who missed class for whatever reason. Certainly class
attendance is often related to learning outcomes, just as item origin is sometimes (but not
always) related to U.S. interest in regulating a foreign transaction, but attendance is not the
real, underlying concern—learning is. Using class attendance as a direct proxy for actual
learning would not fully capture and reward important learning outside the classroom; and
while the system could be made to work somewhat better with certain adjustments and
exceptions, it is still not the best approach, and it unnecessarily complicates matters. We
would want to reform such a system, both to simplify it and make it more effective—and so it
also should be with export control jurisdiction.
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the ire of its trading partners.
This is certainly better than
indiscriminate enforcement efforts, but risk of future crises like the 1982
pipeline crisis remains. Just as importantly, the development of clearer
jurisdictional standards is impaired by the current status quo. While
international law is characterized by indeterminacy in many respects, in
a world characterized by increasing globalization of trade and
jurisdictional overlaps it would be enormously beneficial to achieve
greater clarity regarding jurisdictional reach for export controls.
The discussion thus far starkly illustrates that the current U.S.
approach to export control jurisdiction is legally problematic and not
terribly effective from a practical perspective, both in terms of how it is
administered and how well it supports and advances desired U.S. policy
goals. Can a new approach be devised that is superior to the current
U.S. jurisdictional scheme, both in terms of compliance with
international law prescriptive jurisdiction principles and in terms of
furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy goals? That is,
can a solution be devised that conforms to international law standards
and is realistically viable as a policy matter? And from what other
perspectives can we analyze the longstanding, problematic issue of
extraterritorial U.S. export control jurisdiction in seeking to answer
these questions?
Recent scholarship on central aspects of globalization and
international trade provides useful lenses through which to view the
topic of extraterritorial export control laws. Unlike relevant scholarship
from the 1980s, this scholarship is not directly focused on the topic of
extraterritorial export controls. Rather, the relevance of this newer
scholarship derives from the fact that each approach, in its own way,
seeks to grapple with and explain the interconnectedness of modern
international or transnational trade regulation. These approaches thus
help reframe the issue of export control extraterritoriality and point to
possible, and even realistically viable, solutions for this longstanding
problem. Collectively, they point to a need for greater focus on the
already agreed-upon nonproliferation and missile technology restriction
purposes of export controls as the basis for prescriptive
extraterritoriality.
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A. Network Theory
Network theory has claimed a dominant position in international
legal scholarship in the past decade, with Anne-Marie Slaughter’s
influential book A New World Order perhaps being the highest profile
325
example.
Slaughter asserts that governments, like businesses and
terrorists, operate through global networks, and her work offers a useful
326
perspective from which to analyze export control extraterritoriality.
Slaughter’s approach to globalization and transnational government
interactions rests on the concept of the disaggregated state, as opposed
327
to the traditional conception of the unitary state.
Starting from the
premise that “national governments are losing their ability to formulate
and implement national public policy within territorial borders rendered
increasingly porous by the forces of globalization, immigration, and the
information revolution”—an observation that jibes nicely with the
prescriptive jurisdictional principles of the Restatement (Third)—
Slaughter concludes that some transnational cooperation is necessary in
328
order to make regulatory efforts effective.
She taxonomizes
transnational networks into several categories based on the formality of
329
their structure: formal frameworks, such as the WTO or NAFTA;
informal frameworks that work on a consensual basis, such as the Asia330
331
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) or the G8 (or G20),
or like some of the multilateral export control organizations discussed
332
earlier; and spontaneous networks of communication and cooperation
333
between or among bureaucrats in different countries.
Slaughter
further categorizes networks by their functions: “information exchange
networks,” through which information is shared transnationally;
“harmonization networks,” which work to harmonize national laws in a

325. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 22.
326. Other network scholarship includes, inter alia, Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998).
327. SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 5–6, 12–15.
328. Id. at 262–63; accord MEGHAN L. O’SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS:
STATECRAFT AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2003).
329. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 144–48.
330. See id. at 140–42.
331. See id. at 144.
332. See supra Part II.G.
333. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 132, 139–40.
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particular area; and “enforcement networks,” through which
334
participants work to coordinate transnational enforcement of laws. A
335
single network can perform one or more of these functions. The result
is that transnational networks can take a variety of forms, serve different
functions, and serve more than one function, depending on the desires
and needs of the participants.
Network theory is directly relevant to the area of export controls
and export jurisdiction. There currently are several trans-governmental
export control networks in existence, of differing degrees of formality—
namely the Wassenaar Arrangement, Chemical Weapons Convention,
Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Missile Technology
336
Control Regime. Much of this multilateral coordination has focused
on nonproliferation efforts, but these coordinative efforts have not
addressed jurisdiction. A more deliberate application of network theory
to the matter of extraterritorial export controls yields interesting
insights.
First, the existing export control organizations discussed above are
horizontal networks that largely work as transnational harmonization
networks (to coordinate and harmonize national export control laws,
with particular focus on harmonization of national export classification
schemes), and also as information networks (to share information
among participating states regarding their export control and licensing
decisions), but their use as enforcement networks has been quite
limited. The Wassenaar Arrangement—the most robust and developed
network of these four networks—currently serves as an enforcement
network in a limited fashion, but this is largely limited to transnational
337
coordination of export licensing and restrictions.
For example, for
certain U.S.-origin or -content goods located in certain (but not all)
foreign countries (depending on the export classification of these items),
the United States will allow reexports that otherwise would require a
U.S. license to go forward under the supervision and export control
authority of that foreign country, on the grounds that the United States
338
trusts these foreign governments as regulatory authorities. Technically

334. Id. at 131–33.
335. Id.
336. See supra Part II.G.
337. See The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Techs., supra note 11; see also supra Part II.G.
338. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 740.16 (2013) (providing
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speaking, this is not a renunciation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
United States—it is a transfer of licensing authority to the foreign
government without a waiver of jurisdiction—but a next logical step
would be waiver of jurisdiction in such circumstances. The point made
here is that the existing export control networks, with the Wassenaar
Arrangement in the lead, could be used more robustly as networks to
coordinate, harmonize, and facilitate (as well as limit) the
extraterritorial reach of national export control laws.
To date, of course, this has not happened. It is interesting and
disheartening to realize that for as long as they have existed, all
multilateral export control organizations have relied on—and in the case
of the Wassenaar Arrangement (and its predecessor COCOM) actively
reinforced—the existing and highly problematic item-based
339
classification and licensing schemes of national export controls.
The
system is built on this very scheme of classifying items as a first step
toward determining what export licensing requirements might apply—
but it reinforces an approach that is, increasingly, woefully out of date.
And that, in turn, reinforces the United States’ item origin-based
jurisdictional scheme and its insistence on problematic jurisdictional
assertions.
This sort of blind inertia does not help avert any future jurisdictional
crises in an increasingly interconnected and transnational world. A
deliberate, conscious effort by participating states to harness these
existing networks to engage in a conversation about export control
jurisdiction could prove highly beneficial. These organizations exist
because of consensus about the need for transnational coordination and
cooperation on various aspects of export controls. If we accept (as this
Article argues) that extraterritoriality is a crisis waiting to happen
(again), then these already-existing networks can and should be used as
venues to address and try to resolve this long outstanding problem.

“Additional permissive reexports” (APR) license exception).
339. See The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Techs., How Does the Wassenaar Arrangement Work?,
WASSENAAR.ORG http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/howitworks.html (discussing how
the Wassenaar Arrangement participating countries have “agreed to maintain national export
controls on listed items”); IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31832, THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE 10, 22 (2009)
(discussing the lists controlled by multilateral export controls regimes, and how these groups
use a “common control list” based on the classifications of items).
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B. Mutual Recognition Arrangements
A related but somewhat different approach to examination of
transnational regulation by governments is the “mutual recognition
agreement” (MRA). MRAs have a long history within the European
340
Union
and are most effective where “strong, pre-existing
341
supranational institutions” exist, but they also can prove valuable in
areas of governance and regulation that are dominated by multilateral
342
concerns and different regulatory standards. A key feature of MRAs
is that they offer a way for governments to jointly manage activity in a
particular regulatory area by recognizing and giving credence to each
other’s different approaches, without the need to fully harmonize
343
different national regulations. Central to this is that each state treats
344
the relevant regulations of the other state(s) as equivalent. The result
is a consensual overlapping of jurisdiction (potentially of both
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction) in a particular subject area.
Bilateral or regional MRAs regarding financial markets are prime
345
example of MRAs.
Securities laws and the regulation of financial
markets are historically territorially bound, and in that regard they have
346
grown less suited to regulation of modern transnational business.
MRAs may help avoid the difficult technical and political challenges of
347
harmonizing different regulatory regimes in the same subject area, and

340. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 55, 56 (2011).
341. Id.
342. Nicolaïdis & Shaffer, supra note 23, at 265–66; see also Americo Beviglia Zampetti,
Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Context: Some Reflections on Future Negotiations, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD
TRADE LAW 303 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (discussing mutual
recognition in the context of WTO non-discrimination principles); Kalypso Nicolaïdis, NonDiscriminatory Mutual Recognition: An Oxymoron in the New WTO Lexicon?, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD
TRADE LAW 267 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (same).
343. Verdier, supra note 340, at 63 (“[M]utual recognition may be defined as an
understanding among two or more states under which each recognizes the adequacy of the
other’s regulation or supervision of an activity or institution as a substitute for its own.”).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 56; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Next
Steps for Implementation of Mutual Recognition Concept (Mar. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-49.htm.
346. Verdier, supra note 340, at 71–92.
347. Id. at 62 (“Outside Europe, commentators are increasingly advocating mutual
recognition agreements as a substitute for substantive harmonization.”).
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may help avoid disputes about extraterritorial scope, because the
applicability of a national regime is less dependent on traditional
348
notions of territoriality and nationality.
The longstanding problem of U.S. export control jurisdiction can
benefit from analysis through an MRA lens. There are important
similarities between the regulation of exports and the regulation of
financial markets in terms of their extraterritoriality and transnational
coordination with other regimes. Both the U.S. export control system
and U.S. financial regulatory system, for example, are based on early or
mid-twentieth century statutory schemes and were designed with a far
349
less multilateral and interconnected world in mind. The effectiveness
of the U.S. export control and financial market regimes as closed
regulatory systems—based on territoriality and nationality—has been
reduced significantly by globalization. Both areas of regulation also are
characterized by some measure of transnational cooperation.
They differ, however, in terms of transnational cooperation
regarding treatment of extraterritorial reach. The U.S.-EU Securities
regulation MRA is a system of “managed ‘joint governance’ of
350
extraterritoriality”; in contrast, extraterritoriality in the area of export
controls currently is a system characterized by non-agreement on
351
extraterritoriality. These areas of transnational importance also differ
in terms of just how different the national systems of regulation are.
Interestingly, that difference cuts the other way, with export control
regimes of the United States and its trading partners (jurisdictional
considerations excluded) being far more harmonized through the
Wassenaar Arrangement and other multilateral agreements and
352
organizations discussed above than their financial regulatory systems.
348. See Nicolaïdis & Shaffer, supra note 23.
349. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text (discussing the change from
designating items as problematic based on the end-location to designating items as
problematic based on the end-use of the item from the end of WWII to the present); supra
note 31 and accompanying text (“[C]urrent U.S. export controls originated as a post-World
War II trade-restrictive regime.”); supra notes 65–70 (discussing how the current licensing
simplification reform enacted by President Obama is a necessary change because export
controls are too prohibitive of dual-use items that have a broad commercial appeal).
350. Nicolaïdis & Shaffer, supra note 23, at 268.
351. Bridge, supra note 14, at 2, 4 (discussing how the European community has
expressed views that they do not agree with the US extraterritoriality in export controls).
352. Compare The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., Guidelines & Procedures, Including the Initial Elements,
WASSENAAR.ORG, http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014),

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

677

The export control regimes of the United States and its trading
partners are also driven by common concerns about nonproliferation.
The nonproliferation controls in particular are products of the post-Cold
War era that reflect deep multilateral concerns about rogue regimes and
353
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by smaller states. The
difficulty in successfully employing a mutual recognition approach,
however, is to reach agreement not just on common principles, but also
on the applicability and acceptability of specific (and often technical)
rules. In that sense, export control coordination through mutual
recognition may actually have an advantage over financial regulation,
because technical rules regarding item classification are already
transnationally harmonized among many developed countries through
the Wassenaar Arrangement.
It is thus worth exploring whether consensus might be achieved
about mutual recognition of the jurisdictional reach of the export
control regimes of the United States and its trading partners. These
could be bilateral, as with the United States’ financial regulation MRA
354
with Australia, but preferably would be multilateral, at least to some
extent, and perhaps could be implemented under the auspices of
existing multilateral export control agreements, such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement. An MRA that addressed extraterritoriality would be, in
355
essence, a negotiated solution, as was proposed by Abbott in 1984.
U.S. assertions of jurisdiction could be acknowledged as legitimate by
other participating states, in return for U.S. reciprocation—either in full
or in part—that would permit foreign regulation of activities of similar
concern in the United States. That is to say, in return for foreign
acceptance of U.S. extraterritorial export control jurisdiction, the
United States might allow for some foreign regulation of activity within
the United States and its territories for the same export control
purposes of nonproliferation and control of missile technology.
Of course, mutuality might not result in full symmetry. U.S. trading
partners may not be as interested in extraterritorially regulating activity
as the United States is. It is also possible (and perhaps likely) that the
United States might use its economic and political clout to achieve
with Verdier, supra note 340, at 82–88 (discussing implementation of MRA approach with
Australia).
353. See supra Part II.C.2.
354. See Verdier, supra note 340, at 56; see also Press Release, supra note 345.
355. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 119–20.
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asymmetry: the United States might work to convince its trading
partners to accept greater U.S. extraterritorial reach, in return for less
expansive foreign jurisdictional reach into the United States. That sort
of power imbalance permeates international negotiations and the
development of international law generally, and it is not per se more
problematic in the area of export controls than it is in any other area of
356
international law and international trade regulation.
If consensus is
reached and adhered to, that consensus would not be automatically
357
rendered invalid by unequal bargaining power of the parties involved.
C. Unilateralism and Norm Development
Sarah Cleveland’s work on the intersection of international human
358
rights law and international trade has been deeply influential, but
much of its influence has remained confined to the area of international
human rights. Yet her work on unilateral trade sanctions and norm
development offers useful insights in other areas of international trade
regulation, including export controls.
Cleveland has argued that unilateral trade sanctions can be a means
to spark international dialogue on important subjects, and indeed push
359
the development of new international law norms. Specifically, she has
observed that multilateral (and regional) promotion and enforcement of
international human and labor rights is relatively weak, and that
360
national laws are thus more important for promoting these rights.

356. Paul Schiff Berman asserts that waiving or self-limiting jurisdiction does not raise
sovereignty concerns. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155, 1183 (2007) (“[I]t is no threat to sovereignty for a nation-state to decide that its
sovereign interests are advanced overall by making agreements with other nations that limit
what it can otherwise do.”).
357. This can be contrasted to U.S. cargo security efforts developed after the 9/11
attacks, which presented countries wishing to export products to the United States with a
difficult choice of either (a) accepting additional U.S. regulation and supervision of foreign
supply chains or (b) facing greater import processing times into the United States, and in
some cases even rejection of shipments. Bowman, supra note 16, at 203–16, 226 (summarizing
the U.S. cargo security efforts developed after the 9/11 attacks). Such is not the case here. It
is difficult to imagine the United States imposing new, broad import restrictions in order to
force its trading partners to accept extraterritorial export control jurisdiction—and even if the
United States decided to do that, it is hard to imagine that it would not be challenged as a
violation of the United States’ WTO obligations.
358. See Cleveland, supra note 5, at 133; Cleveland, supra note 24, at 3.
359. Cleveland, supra note 24, at 7.
360. Id. at 3.
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) have consolidated an
international free trade regime, but multilateral efforts to use
international trade to encourage compliance with labor and
human rights norms have been consistently rejected by
developing countries, which criticize such efforts as protectionist
and imperialist. Regional trade regimes such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European
Union (EU) have proven more receptive to incorporating labor
and environmental concerns into their trading systems. With the
notable exception of the EU, however, enforcement mechanisms
in regional trade regimes also remain weak.
In light of the limited possibilities for multilateral
enforcement of international norms, domestic law mechanisms
361
for this purpose have become [more] important.
Cleveland also discusses how the United States uses unilateral trade
sanctions—both limited sanctions such as investment restrictions and
full embargoes—“to encourage foreign states to comply with
362
Whereas the traditional discussion of
international [law] norms.”
trade sanctions focuses on their use to “punish and alter” certain
behavior by other states, Cleveland considers how unilateral trade
sanctions can “assist[] in the international definition, promulgation,
363
recognition, and domestic internalization of human rights norms.” She
observes that unilateral trade sanctions might be imposed in violation of
international law, but that the reaction of other states to these trade
sanctions—that is, the acceptance of these sanctions—might indicate
364
evolutionary development of the international law norms at play.
Such sanctions also might help define the boundaries of these norms, as
well as promote these norms by helping to internalize them into the
365
domestic legal systems of the states implementing the sanctions.
Unilateral sanctions, Cleveland asserts, also can help bring international
attention to bear on certain human rights and labor rights violations of
international law, and might lead to the stronger development of
international law norms by both strengthening multilateral support and
361. Id.
362. Id. at 4.
363. Id. at 6.
364. Id. at 6–7 (citing Weisburd, supra note 272).
365. Id. at 6 (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997)).
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encouraging states to implement domestic law measures to promote
366
those international rights.
Cleveland’s analysis translates well to an analysis of U.S. export
control extraterritoriality. As has been discussed in this Article, the
United States’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in perpetuity,
based on the U.S. origin or content of items located abroad, is a
unilateral claim that is unmatched in its scope. However, there are
important international norms and values underlying this U.S. assertion
of extraterritorial jurisdiction—namely nonproliferation and missile
technology. A shift from extraterritorial jurisdiction based on item
origin to extraterritorial jurisdiction based on these reasons for concern
and control might render broad U.S. assertions of export control
prescriptive jurisdiction less objectionable to other states, might lead to
greater discussion of this approach, and even might lead to overt
acceptance of (and perhaps even adoption of) this jurisdictional
approach by other countries.
Such a change would require a subtle, but critically important, shift
in position by the United States. The position no longer would be that
the United States always has prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on item origin but chooses, in its discretion, not to take
enforcement actions in all cases. Rather, the position would be that the
United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities outside the
United States that raise certain nonproliferation and missile technology
concerns about which there is general multilateral consensus, but not
over nonproblematic activities outside the United States.
The
enforcement focus of the United States would be largely the same—
namely, on these problematic activities—but jurisdiction would not be
based on an item origin-based approach pursuant to which “U.S. law
367
[always] runs with the goods.”
Instead, assertions of jurisdiction
would be based on concerns for which there is a great deal of
commonality among the United States and its trading partners. Such an
approach would cut to the heart of the matter, instead of requiring
assertions of jurisdiction to jump awkwardly through an item origin
hoop.
This shift in jurisdictional focus could make a significant difference,
depending on how aggressively (and unilaterally) or conservatively (and

366. Id. at 7.
367. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 54.
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consensually) the United States decided to interpret the
nonproliferation and missile technology concerns in question. Highly
aggressive interpretations based solely on U.S. concerns not shared by
other countries might lead to little real change from the current state of
affairs, because little or no more consensus about the scope of U.S.
jurisdiction would be reached. However, an approach based on shared
principles could go a long way to rendering much of the
extraterritoriality of the U.S. export control regime not only less
objectionable, but also more permissible as a matter of international
law—either because it fits within the existing jurisdictional bases or
because international consensus evolves to accept these assertions of
prescriptive jurisdiction.
Moreover, to the extent that the United States has strongly held
concerns that fall under the categories of nonproliferation or missile
technology, a unilateral assertion of jurisdiction by the United States
might result, in some cases at least, in greater dialogue about such
claims, and perhaps even acceptance of such assertions of jurisdiction,
along the lines that Cleveland addresses in the context of international
368
human and labor rights.
There certainly is no guaranty of that
happening, and it would be naïve to suggest that it always (or even
often) will occur. But if the past thirty years have taught us anything
about U.S. export control jurisdiction, it is that the current U.S.
approach to extraterritorial export controls is a dead end in terms of
international consensus and the development of international law. It is
a crisis waiting to happen—or to use Cleveland’s words, the current item
origin-based approach is not “consistent with broader principles of the
international community, such as principles of international jurisdiction,
369
nonintervention, and free trade.”
In contrast, basing jurisdiction on
underlying reasons for control that are more generally accepted would
offer, at the very least, the possibility that such unilateral assertions of
U.S. jurisdiction, if reasonably tailored, might actually encourage further
dialogue, reduce the risk of serious trade disputes, and lead to greater
jurisdictional consensus regarding outbound trade.

368. See generally Cleveland, supra note 24.
369. Id. at 7.

BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

682

7/8/2014 6:30 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[97:3

V. A MODERN APPROACH TO EXPORT CONTROL
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL
JURISDICTIONAL CONSENSUS
With these insights from network theory, MRA scholarship, and
unilateral action/norm development scholarship in mind, what changes
might we recommend for the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. export
control regime and for jurisdiction within the multilateral export control
system generally? This Article posits four main steps and principles: (a)
U.S. abandonment of item-based export control jurisdiction in favor of a
purpose-based approach that rests on the existing multilateral consensus
about the underlying purposes of export controls; (b) greater focus on
enforcement considerations; (c) a willingness to engage in a “regional”
approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction, as opposed to a uniform
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction; and (d) greater tolerance for
asymmetry.
A. U.S. Abandonment of Item-Based Export Control Jurisdiction
This first step is a clear one. If this Article has accomplished nothing
else, it should at least compellingly illustrate the fatally flawed nature of
extraterritorial jurisdiction based on item origin.
In its place,
jurisdiction—both by the United States and its trading partners—should
be premised, to the extent possible, on mutually shared policy goals.
Happily, strong multilateral consensus already exists regarding key
policy goals of export control regimes—namely, proliferation and
missile technology concerns, and the U.S. export control regime is
370
infused with these goals. An expressly renewed focus by the United
States on these areas of multilateral consensus can help avoid the most
extreme assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, while at the same time
maintaining rigorous attention on core concerns that have driven these
broad assertions of jurisdiction in the first place.
To be sure, there would be cases in which the United States (and
other countries) would be tempted to assert jurisdiction over external
activities that do not fall within the scope of nonproliferation or missile
technology concerns. “National security” is largely a self-defined
concept. And it is true, in fact, that the 1982 Soviet pipeline dispute did
not involve proliferation or missile technology concerns—although it
perhaps did indirectly, at least for the United States, because much of
370. See supra Part II.D.2.
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the concern was about preventing Soviet access to hard currency that
might benefit Soviet military development. The argument made here,
however, is that such instances would be better addressed on a case-bycase basis and treated as exceptions to the general approach, rather than
as instances that define jurisdictional reach as a general matter. To treat
such cases as exceptions would help keep the central focus on the areas
of multilateral consensus—which are fairly well developed through the
existing multilateral export control agreements and organizations
discussed above—and in turn help define the boundaries of this
multilateral consensus in an iterative fashion going forward. That is, the
justifications and needs for specific unilateral assertions of jurisdiction
could be addressed on their own merits; and perhaps, in some cases,
unilateral assertions of jurisdiction that exceeded the bounds of this
consensus might lead to modifications of the accepted boundaries of
prescriptive extraterritoriality. In contrast, not to treat such cases as
exceptions would keep the jurisdictional analysis centered on unilateral
self-interest, which would prevent such clarification or evolution, and
thus leave the boundaries of acceptable extraterritorial jurisdiction
vague and ill-suited to clear consensus. That is the current status quo—
the sadly unhelpful legacy of the 1982 Soviet pipeline dispute. It is a
legacy that should be put to rest.
B. Greater Focus on Enforcement Considerations
The second step, greater focus on enforcement considerations,
would be an important step in the development of the existing
transnational export control regime. As previously discussed, the
current multilateral regime is comprised of various agreements and
371
organizations that serve largely as horizontal harmonization networks
for national export control regimes, and also as information networks
372
for the sharing of export licensing decisions.
While there is some
multilateral coordination of enforcement matters—such as via the
United States’ current “License Exception APR” that permits reexports
from certain countries, provided that those reexports are permissible
373
under those foreign countries’ export control laws —these exceptions
are ad hoc carve-outs, not systemic adjustments. Certainly from the
371. See supra Part II.G.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 325–36.
373. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 740.16 (2013) (License
Exception “APR”).
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United States’ perspective, such enforcement coordination has not been
used to address or define the jurisdictional reach of export controls.
Changing from the current approach to one that places greater
attention on harmonizing the relationship between export control
enforcement and export control jurisdictional reach could result in a
multilateral export control regime that is more robust and effective.
Efforts to better define (consensually) what is and is not an acceptable
extraterritorial application of national export control laws would help
avoid controversy in future matters, and also would promote
cooperation in terms of coordinated assistance in enforcement. Greater
U.S. confidence in the enforcement efforts of its trading partners would
make forgoing extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction more feasible,
which in turn would make it easier to achieve consensus on the
acceptable prescriptive reach of national export control laws.
Moreover, nothing in this approach would prevent the reassertion of
prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction in the future if concern emerged
about the effectiveness of coordinated enforcement efforts. That is, a
country’s consensual agreement to limits on its prescriptive export
control jurisdiction would go hand in hand with confidence about its
trading partners’ nonproliferation and missile technology export control
enforcement efforts—and legitimate concerns about a trading partner’s
enforcement efforts could justify renewed extraterritorial jurisdiction in
order to address the underlying nonproliferation and missile technology
goals.
Finally, such assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction would have the
strong advantage of being justified under the existing prescriptive
jurisdictional principles of international law, in a way that the current
U.S. item-based approach to jurisdiction is not. There is potentially
much upside, and little downside, in seeking to foster greater
coordination and harmonization of enforcement efforts, and to do so in
a way that helps define the acceptable scope of extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction. In contrast, failure to achieve better definition
would leave the boundaries of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
grey, which would impair the ability to develop a stronger transnational
export control enforcement network. And it is clear that a central part
of fostering greater multilateral consensus about extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction, and thus facilitating greater coordination and
cooperation regarding enforcement efforts, is the United States’
abandonment of item-based export control jurisdiction.
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C. A Willingness to Engage in a “Regional” Approach
The revised approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction advocated here
would not need to be implemented wholesale or all at once, in fully
multilateral fashion. Indeed, insistence on full multilateralism likely
would guarantee little or no positive progress—much in the same way
that the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations has ground to a
374
halt. In many respects, the significant developments in supranational
375
international trade regulation are taking place at the sub-global level.
Instead, the revised approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction
advocated in this Article could be implemented at first on a bilateral
basis or among a small number of countries, and subsequently be scaled
up as circumstances permit. The approach could proceed along the lines
of the regional integration of Europe following World War II, by
starting with a core of countries that can achieve consensus and
broadening to include more over time. Implementation could be
through the multilateral export control organizations and agreements
that currently exist—either informally through their member states, or
more formally as modifications to the organizations’ express goals or
official agreements (for those such as the Wassenaar Arrangement that
do have such agreements in place). This non-multilateral approach also
might be implemented through current and future preferential trade
376
agreements (PTAs) to which the United States is a party —again,
either as informal arrangements or as more official side agreements or

374. See DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 5 (2009) (describing preferential trade agreements as “the [current] darling of
international trade negotiators” due in part to “frustration with the stalled Doha Round”);
see also Amiti Sen, Year-End Doha Round Meeting in Bali Likely to Yield Results: Lamy,
HINDU BUS. LINE (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/yearenddoha-round-meeting-in-bali-likely-to-yield-results-lamy/%20article4361461.ece?homepage=tr
ue&ref=wl_home (noting a lack of progress in the WTO Doha Round since 2001);
Multilateralism Dying? China’s Rise Raises Questions for World Trade, BUS. STANDARD (Feb
., 17, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/ opinion/multilateralism-dying-1130270
0529_1.html (discussing the impact of China’s economic rise on multilateralism in
international trade regulation).
375. See Gantz, supra note 374, at 5.
376. This Article uses the term “preferential trade agreement,” as opposed to “free
trade agreement” or “regional trade agreement” because it more accurately describes the
nature of these agreements as (a) not always being “free trade agreements” in the traditional
sense, and (b) not always being focused on regional integration. See Gregory W. Bowman,
The Domestic and International Policy Implications of “Deep” Versus “Broad” Preferential Trade
Agreements, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 497 (2009).
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modifications to PTAs (such as the North American Free Trade
377
Agreement and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement ).
As David Gantz has noted in the context of regional trade
liberalization, there is a growing sense that “it may be possible to
accomplish a degree of trade liberalization on a sub-global level that is
378
impossible or at least much more difficult to achieve globally.”
The
same observation holds true for the harmonization of export controls
generally, and for coordination of export control extraterritorial
jurisdictional reach specifically.
D. Tolerance for Asymmetry
Consensus regarding the proper scope of extraterritorial prescriptive
jurisdiction would not have to lead to symmetry, either in terms of the
breadth of extraterritoriality asserted by participating countries or the
nature of export control laws that are applied extraterritorially. With
respect to the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction, it might well be that
some of the United States’ trading partners would not have the same
degree of interest in asserting extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction as
the United States does. That sort of waiver or self-limiting of
jurisdiction is permissible—and the fact that such decisions might be
influenced by other factors, such as power imbalances between countries
or in return for other benefits gained through negotiations with other
countries (such as, for example, favorable bilateral investment treaty
provisions) would not render those decisions less permissible or
379
legitimate.
It is thus entirely likely, perhaps even probable, that the
United States would assert broader extraterritorial prescriptive
jurisdiction than many of its trading partners. Moreover, with respect to
the laws for which prescriptive jurisdiction would be asserted, it is
entirely possible, and again probably likely, that there would be
differences in national export control rules, even when there was not a
difference in the breadth of reach. That is to say, the underlying policies
of these different national export control laws would need to be the
same, but the mechanics of these laws and the decisions reached under
them likely would be somewhat different. This sort of MRA approach
to export jurisdiction and export control decision-making would help to
377. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, USTR.GOV,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
378. Gantz, supra note 374, at 5.
379. See Berman, supra note 356, at 1183.
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facilitate consensus about the appropriate scope of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, and also make cooperation more feasible by allowing for
the coexistence of regimes that have similar goals but different
regulatory mechanisms and which might sometimes reach different
decisions regarding particular transactions.
To posit one hypothetical example, the United Kingdom currently
sees itself as more internationally interconnected than the United States
380
but less directly threatened by external forces than the United States.
With respect to the reach of jurisdiction, one might reasonably predict
that the United Kingdom might be more willing than the United States
to forgo the assertion of extraterritorial export control jurisdiction over
activities abroad—and in fact, it has not asserted extraterritorial export
381
control jurisdiction as broadly as the United States.
One also might
posit that, to the extent the United Kingdom was interested in broader
extraterritorial application of its export controls, it might be willing to
forgo such assertions of jurisdiction in return for trade or investment
concessions (or other concessions for that matter) from the United
States. We might posit further that the United States might be willing to
give such concessions, both in order to ensure that its assertions of
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction within the United Kingdom
were accepted by the United Kingdom, and to preclude similar U.K.
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction within the United States.
Continuing with this same example, we could expect that, with
respect to the nature of U.S. and U.K. export control laws themselves,

380. Compare A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY 3 (2010) (“Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than
in most of her long history. More secure, in the sense that we do not currently face, as we
have so often in our past, a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power.
But more vulnerable, because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is more
networked than ever before.”), with THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 20, at foreword (“For
nearly a decade, our Nation has been at war with a far-reaching network of violence and
hatred.”).
381. The United Kingdom’s export control regime relies on export licenses and end-user
statements (“undertaking forms”) as a means to prevent diversion at the front end, much in
the same way that U.S. export controls did in the decades following World War II. There is
no general U.K. assertion of jurisdiction over items outside the United Kingdom. See Dep't
for Bus. Innovation & Skills, End-User and Stockist Undertakings for SIELs and Consignee
Undertakings for OIELs, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/end-user-and-consignee-undertakings
-for-siels-and-oiels (last updated Sept. 21, 2012); see also Dep’t for Business Innovation &
Skills, Export Controls: An Introductory Guide, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/beginnersguide-to-export-controls (last updated Sept. 19, 2013) (providing general guidance regarding
U.K. export controls).
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the transaction review and licensing mechanisms of the U.S. and U.K.
export control regimes likely would be somewhat different, and it also is
likely that the export licensing determinations of the U.S. and U.K.
export control regimes might differ in some respects. To the extent that
both national export control regimes applied to a transaction, there
would need to be coordination regarding which national export control
regime would take priority, and how conflicting licensing determinations
would be resolved. It is common in international trade for the
international trade laws of multiple countries to apply to a single
transaction, so this is not an original or novel matter—and indeed
overlapping prescriptive jurisdiction is a hallmark feature of modern
382
international law generally. The point made here is that such overlaps
are not per se problematic, are to be anticipated, and can be better
managed if the boundaries of permissible export control jurisdiction are
more clearly defined than they are today.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE MECHANICS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The purpose of the changes recommended in this Article is to reduce
the likelihood of future international trade disputes concerning export
control jurisdiction, and to facilitate changes that ensure greater
consistency of the U.S. export control regime with international law
prescriptive jurisdictional principles. This Article therefore has focused
squarely on assessing the current state of doctrine and recommending
practical steps for meaningful and successful change. While the topic
itself is complex and policy-laden, the resolution of the matter as a
matter of U.S. law is in fact strikingly, indeed stunningly, simple and
straightforward.
First, alteration of the jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls
would not require statutory amendments or enactment of new federal
legislation, because the current U.S. export control regime largely
consists of agency regulations promulgated under broad statutory
383
mandate.
Regardless of one’s concerns about the antidemocratic
384
nature of such implementation or the wisdom of broad congressional
delegations to the executive under American constitutional law, such
broad delegation clearly is permissible under current U.S. constitutional

382. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403 cmt. d.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 40–50.
384. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 184.
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385

doctrine,
and indeed represents the U.S. norm in matters of
international trade regulation, due to the technical and policy-driven
386
nature of the field.
Second, the regulatory changes required are modest in the extreme.
The overall classification and licensing scheme of U.S. export controls
could stay in place. While the current classification and licensing
scheme suffers from its own very serious problems, as discussed
387
elsewhere, resolving the jurisdictional issues of the U.S. export control
regime does not require tackling that thorny but separate issue. In other
words, jurisdiction can be fixed without requiring a full rebuild of the
388
regulatory structure of U.S. export controls.
In fact, solving the vexing jurisdictional problem of U.S. export
controls boils down, amazingly, to just a single regulatory definition—
namely the definition of “Items subject to the EAR.” The current
definition, which is set forth in its entirety below, clearly demonstrates
the EAR’s reliance on item origin as the core basis for jurisdiction.
§ 734.3 ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE EAR
(a) Except for items excluded in paragraph (b) of this section
[which pertains to items subject to the export jurisdiction of
other U.S. government agencies; certain informational materials
such as magazines and newspapers; and publicly available nonencryption technology and software (which is generally noncommercial)], the following items are subject to the EAR:
(1) All items in the United States, including in a U.S. Foreign
Trade Zone or moving intransit through the United States from
one foreign country to another;
(2) All U.S. origin items wherever located;
385. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 328–30
(2002).
386. Of course, statutory resolution is possible—Congress can and does involve itself
directly in trade regulatory matters—and Abbott suggested congressional resolution of the
matter in the 1980s. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 113. The point made here is that it is not
necessary, due to existing broad delegations to the executive.
387. For further discussion, see Bowman, supra note 9, at 340–43; Bowman, supra note
64.
388. The express language of the EAR in fact supports this bifurcated approach: Section
734.2(a)(3) of the EAR admonishes that “[t]he term ‘subject to the EAR’ should not be
confused with licensing or other requirements.” Export Administration Regulations, 15
C.F.R. § 734.2(a)(3) (2013).
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(3) Foreign-made commodities that incorporate controlled U.S.origin commodities, foreign-made commodities that are
‘bundled’ with controlled U.S.-origin software, foreign-made
software that is commingled with controlled U.S.-origin software,
and foreign-made technology that is commingled with controlled
U.S.-origin technology:
(i) In any quantity, as described in § 734.4(a) of this part; or
(ii) In quantities exceeding the de minimis levels, as described in
§ 734.4(c) or § 734.4(d) of this part;
(4) Certain foreign-made direct products of U.S. origin
technology or software, as described in § 736.2(b)(3) of the
EAR. The term “direct product” means the immediate product
(including processes and services) produced directly by the use
of technology or software; and
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (A)(4): Certain foreign-manufactured
items developed or produced from U.S.-origin encryption items
exported pursuant to License Exception ENC are subject to the
EAR. See sections 740.17(a) and 740.17(b)(4)(ii) of the EAR.
(5) Certain commodities produced by any plant or major
component of a plant located outside the United States that is a
direct product of U.S.-origin technology or software, as
389
described in § 736.2(b)(3) of the EAR.
If we were to delete subsections (2) through (5) of this provision,
and tweak the existing language to focus on transactions rather than
items, we would transform the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export
controls from being item-based to being purpose-based. A modified
Section 734.3 could read as follows:
§ 734.3 TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE EAR
(a) Except for items excluded in paragraph (b) of this section
[which pertains to items subject to the export jurisdiction of
other U.S. government agencies; certain informational materials
such as magazines and newspapers; and publicly available nonencryption technology and software (which is generally noncommercial)], transactions in the following items are subject to
the EAR:
389. Id. § 734.3.
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(1) All items in the United States, including in a U.S. Foreign
Trade Zone;
(2) All items moving intransit through the United States from
one foreign country to another.
Jurisdiction over foreign activities that raise proliferation or missile
technology concerns—that is, items for which section 734.3(a)’s
territorial jurisdiction is not sufficient—are already captured by the
current language of section 734.5(a) of the EAR, which does not rely on
item origin for the assertion of jurisdiction. That section, which would
not need to be revised, reads as follows:
§ 734.5 ACTIVITIES OF U.S. AND FOREIGN PERSONS
SUBJECT TO THE EAR
The following kinds of activities are subject to the EAR:
(a) Certain activities of U.S. persons related to the proliferation
of nuclear explosive devices, chemical or biological weapons,
missile technology as described in § 744.6 of the EAR, and the
proliferation of chemical weapons as described in part 745 of the
EAR.
(b) Activities of U.S. or foreign persons prohibited by any order
issued under the EAR, including a Denial Order issued pursuant
to part 766 of the EAR.
By moving away from item-based jurisdiction and toward “purposebased” jurisdiction that centers jurisdiction on mutual (and serious)
concerns, U.S. export controls could move away from the current
problematic jurisdictional scheme, but still maintain sufficiently broad
jurisdictional reach based on existing end-use and end-user concerns set
forth in the EAR. The core problem of the current approach would be
eliminated, and future U.S. export control efforts would be placed in
greater harmony with the approaches of the United States’ trading
partners. And the rest of the U.S. export control edifice could remain
intact.
This solution may seem anticlimactic, especially after 90-plus pages
of build-up. It is admittedly odd that resolving a three decades-old
quandary could boil down to changes to a single regulatory definition.
Or perhaps it is not odd at all. Perhaps it is simply a matter of not
having focused on the right issue, of not having asked the right question
in recent years. Current U.S. efforts at export control reform—with
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their focus on simplifying the item classification scheme of U.S. export
controls—suggest that this may indeed be so.
Regardless of the reason, it is unfortunate that the expansive itembased jurisdictional approach has remained in place for so very long.
The 1982 expansion of U.S. export control jurisdiction was not an
insignificant change, and it did not go unnoticed—and yet it is still with
us. The world has changed dramatically since then, in ways that make
item-based jurisdiction increasingly awkward and insufficient—and yet
this remains the basis for U.S. export control jurisdiction. This approach
simply has become a feature of the regulatory terrain to be navigated,
and it has ceased to be questioned.
This Article has sought to counter that implicit assumption by
showing that item-based jurisdiction is not a foreordained necessity, and
that it presents serious and unnecessary difficulties. The benefits of
resolution are great, and the administrative cost of resolution is low.
Something should be done to fix it—and it is clear what that
“something” is. The change may be subtle, but it is far from merely
semantic.
In the final analysis, the will to act may be the greatest bar to fixing
the jurisdictional inadequacy of U.S. export controls. Will U.S. officials
pay enough attention to this issue, for a brief moment at least, to
appreciate the potential risks of inaction and the potential benefits (and
lack of risk) involved in action? Predicting the future can be difficult, so
perhaps the best answer we can give is “Hopefully yes.” Or more
precisely, “Hopefully yes, and hopefully soon.” It is quite possible that
we are in a window of shrinking opportunity for the jurisdictional
reform advocated for in this Article—both because sooner or later
another large export trade dispute will emerge, and because the United
390
States’ time as a global hegemon may be drawing to a close. Future
U.S. success in international trade matters likely will be based on more
multilateral approaches—and it is axiomatic that negotiating preferred
outcomes multilaterally is easier when one’s power is greater. The
longer the United States waits to address the problematic nature of its
item-based extraterritorial export control jurisdiction, the less leverage

390. See N. INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS,
at ii, x (2012) (stating that “[t]here will not be any hegemonic power. Power will shift to
networks and coalitions in a multipolar world,” and that “[t]he U.S. most likely will remain
‘first among equals.’”).
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and maneuvering room it may have to achieve the (asymmetric) results
that satisfy it.
In cases such as this where the payoff is large, the risks are low, the
action is simple, and delay is harmful, the answer to the question
“Should we do this?” is almost always “Yes.” What now remains to be
seen is whether, in this matter of export jurisdiction, logic or inertia
prevails.

